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IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF INTANGIBLES:
MISSOURI'S SECTION 466.010 IN PERSPECTIVE
RussL. W. BAKml*
Introductory Statement
Among many measures considered in the Missouri legislative sessions
of 1951 was the now moderately famous Senate Bill 63, dealing with
the administration of estates of non-residents. By the time the bill was
reached in committee, its provisions-much to the amazement of its prin-
cipal sponsor, the Board of Governors of the Missouri Bar-had pro-
duced inter-state repercussions. Governors Stevenson of Illinois and
Arn of Kansas expressed themselves in opposition to enactment. The
Attorney General of Kansas, accompanied by officials of the Kansas Tax
Department and members of the Kansas Legislature, journeyed to Jeffer-
son City and on March 31, 1951, personally appeared before the Senate
Judiciary Committee where they opposed passage of the bill on several
grounds. It was said that the bill would deprive the State of Kansas
of inheritance tax revenues, and yet perhaps cause double taxation of
many estates; that it would entail double administration of many estates,
one in Missouri and one in Kansas, much to the expense and discom-
fiture of the beneficiaries; that the bill perhaps was unconstitutional.
Notwithstanding these and similar pressures from other sources, the
bill speedily passed the Legislature, unanimously in the Senate and by
a vote of 116 to 2 in the House. Upon presentation of the measure to
Governor Smith for his action, the Governor set a special hearing, at
which he received all interested groups, heard their views and accepted
written briefs respecting the propriety of the legislation. On August 20th
*Member Kansas City Bar. B.S. University of Kansas, 1942; J.D. University of
Michigan, 1948.
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he gave his approval and the bill became law effective October 9, 1951.1
So ended a period of almost thirty years in which Missouri by sheer
self-denial had refused to allow any effective administration upon the
estates of non-residents. 2 Since 1923 the desires of beneficiaries, execu-
tors and trustees to use the convenient administration machinery of Mis-
souri courts had been thwarted by an unusual series of legislative enact-
ments. Now Senate Bill 63, if certain conditions are met, leaves it to the
judgment of the parties interested in the estate whether they will ask for
Missouri administration.
Two years have elapsed and experience with the application of the
new law now permits an appraisal of its provisions with clearer perspec-
tive. It is the purpose of this article to consider the legislative history and
background of Section 466.010 (Part I), and the general scope and effect
of administrations of intangibles (Part H). Special attention is given
to problems of situs of corporate stock in Part MI, and in Part IV, to
constitutional limitations, of due process and full faith and credit, as they
relate to probate decrees and jurisdiction. In Part V there will be con-
sidered the effect of a new Kansas statute having an apparent intention
of interfering with, and attempting to nullify, Missouri administrations
of the estates of Kansas decedents,3 and the probable reception of the
Kansas statute in the courts.
I. HISTORY OF SEcTmoN 466.010
The original legislative action regarding administration of intangibles
in Missouri came in 1923 when the legislature had before it decisions
such as those in Crohn v. Clay County State Bank4 and Troll v. Third
National Bank of St. Louis,5 which definitely called for correction. In
the Crohn case the Kansas City Court of Appeals held that payment of a
deposit by the defendant bank to an Iowa domiciliary executor did not
properly acquit the bank of its liability and the public administrator of
Jackson County, who received letters after such payment, could recover
the deposit a second time. The court felt that it was bound to reach this
1. Mo. Laws 1951, p. 882, approved August 20, 1951, effective October 9, 1951,
repealing and re-enacting Mo. Rlv. STAT. § 466.010 (1949).
2. Although the refusal to administer had extended only to personal property
of intangible form-stocks, bonds, credits and other choses in action-that form
happened to be the one in which an overwhelming proportion of an individual's
wealth is customarily kept.
3. Senate Bill 190, passed in the closing days of the recent Kansas session,
approved by the Governor March 30, 1953.
4. 137 Mo. App. 712, 118 S.W. 498 (1909).
5. 278 Mo. 74, 211 S.W. 545 (1919).
[Vol. 19
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conclusion because of earlier decisions of the Missouri Supreme Court 6
and refused to accept the distinction that in those cases the payment to
the foreign representative occurred after local letters had issued. In
the Troll case, the supreme court required administration of shares of
stock of a St. Louis bank, although the certificates had been administered
at the Illinois domicile, and there were no debts or other assets in Mis-
souri.
Decisions such as these no doubt caused unnecessary administrations
in Missouri with delay and expense far out of proportion to the amounts
involved. As a result, the legislature enacted a new section, 271-a,7 of
the Revised Statutes. The section permitted avoidance of administration
of intangibles not exceeding $1000.00 in value if the foreign personal
representative filed certified copies of his appointment in the proper
Missouri probate court, together with his affidavit that there were no
debts or tangible property in Missouri. If, at the end of six months after
such filing, no claims were presented or remained unpaid and the court
was satisfied that there was no tangible property in Missouri, a certificate
issued vesting the foreign personal representative with rights to the Mis-
souri intangibles.
This statutory solution, confined to small estates, was not entirely
inappropriate in its original form, but it became so in 1925, when the
lawmakers saw fit to extend the prohibition to large estates as well as
small, by striking out the $1000.00 limitation on the application of Sec-
tion 271-a. Administration of purely intangible estates in Missouri thus
became impossible regardless of their value, where decedents were non-
residents, if no Missouri debts appeared.8
The statute continued in that form for nearly twenty years,9 until
1943, when the legislators decided that the "benefits" of the section
should not be restricted to wholly intangible estates, but should be applied
to mixed estates, and amended Section 272 accordingly. As a collateral
matter, procedure was simplified; applications and affidavits in the pro-
bate court were eliminated and the statute became self-executing. The
resulting Section 272, inasmuch as it is the immediate predecessor of
6. E.g. Bartlett v. Hyde, 3 Mo. 490 (1834). See generally Fizzell, Payment of
Debt of Foreign Representatives or Heirs, 18 Mo. LAW BULL. 3 (1920).
7. Mo. Laws 1923, p. 107. Approved April 2, 1923, effective June 25, 1923.
8. Mo. Laws 1925, p. 101. Approved April 29, 1925, effective July 9, 1925.
9. Mo. Rav. STAT. § 273 (1929); Mo. REv. STAT. § 272 (1939).
19541
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Senate Bill 63, is set forth in the margin.' 0 As will be noted in a careful
reading the 1943 version was worded so that ancillary administration of
land and tangibles was maintained as before, but administration of intan-
gibles could be had only if Missouri land and tangibles were insufficient
to discharge debts. Observe the incredible result: A merchant doing all
his business in Missouri, whose home was across the state line in Kansas,
would upon death have his business property administered in two states.
His merchandise inventory, business fixtures and equipment-tangibles-
were aminitered under the jurisdiction of the Missouri probate court.
His cash in a Missouri bank and his accounts receivable from Missouri
customers-intangibres-could not be administered there, but were frozen
for a period of six months, after which they were transmitted to his
domiciliary executor at the place of his residence, and administered upon
in another probate court. If our Missouri merchant had debts and
administration expenses, as he no doubt would, note that they were to be
satisfied from the sale of merchandise and business equipment; only if
insufficient amounts were realized at the forced sale of these items could
resort be had to his cash in bank and his highly liquid accounts receivable.
Lawyers will have to forgive the layman who feels that this arrangement
was somewhat inefficient, where not catastrophic.
10. Mo. Laws 1943, p. 129, Approved July 26, 1943, effective Nov. 22, 1943, reads as
follows:
"Section 272. Administration of estates of non-resident decedents-how and
when made. No letters of administration shall be granted upon the estate of any
decedent non-resident as to any shares of stock, bonds, credits or choses in action
except upon the application of a creditor within this State or upon the showing to the
Court by an ancillary administrator within this State that the lands and other personal
property of such decedent within this State will not be sufficient to discharge the
debts of such estate. Such application or showing shall be made in the probate court
of that county in Missouri in which letters of administration might otherwise be
granted, within a period of six months after the granting or refusal of letters upon
the estate of such decedent at his domicile, or in the event no order refusing letters is
made nor administration had upon the estate of such decedent at his domicile, then
within six months after the date of death of such decedent. Unless before the
expiration of such period of time an ancillary administrator within this State,
pursuant to application or showing as herein provided, has made a demand for
transfer, payment or delivery upon such shares of stocks, bonds, credits, or- choses in
action, such shares of stock, bonds, credits or choses in action may be transferred,
paid or delivered to or in the name of the domiciliary executor or administrator or
upon his order, or to any heir, legatee, distributee or other person entitled thereto;
and the person, firm or corporation or agents thereof making such transfer, payment
or delivery shall not be liable for the debts of or claims against any such decedent or
his estate by reason of having made such transfer, payment or delivery. Any letters
granted upon the application of a creditor under the terms of this section shall be
revoked immediately upon showing to the court the satisfaction in any manner of
the debt upon which such application was granted, together with all other claims,
and debts filed on or before the date of such satisfaction and the payment of all
court costs and fees of such proceedings."
[Vol. 19
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The result of the 1943 amendment to Section 272 was not felt in
the central regions of Missouri, but along the eastern and western
borders of the state the impracticability of the law was recognized when
experience with it became widespread. Particularly acute was the situa-
tion in Kansas City where the metropolitan business community is to a
great extent concentrated in Missouri, but large and growing residential
areas are situated immediately across the state boundary in Johnson
County, Kansas. The persons resident there are frequently those whose
estates are large, but whose business interests are inextricably mingled in
the Missouri community. The bulk of their estates, save for jointly-owned
residences and automobiles, is usually in Missouri. Consequently, the dis-
criminatory 1943 Missouri amendment was of real concern to them and
their legal advisers. In addition, Kansas law had discriminatory features.
Kansas had enacted, in 1939, a new probate code which prohibited foreign
corporations, including both national and state banks of other states, from
acting as testamentary trustees of wills of Kansas residents, and the sub-
sequent decisions of the Kansas Supreme Court interpreting the prohibi-
tion have given it exceedingly strong operation.'" The net result of the
Missouri and Kansas statutes, after 1943, was that a Johnson County
testator having his principal, intangible assets in Missouri could not
appoint his Missouri bank, with which he had done business all his life
and whose trust officers inspired his confidence, as his testamentary
trustee. Missouri's statute placed a freeze on his assets for a period of
six months after his death, then compelled that property to be trans-
mitted to the Kansas Executor. The Kansas statute prohibited its return
to Missouri for trust administration. Thus Missouri forced assets down
a one-way street to Kansas and Kansas law securely trapped them. It
normally came as a surprise to a Kansan planning his will to find that
his intangible property kept in a safe deposit box in a Missouri bank and
his bank accounts could not at his death be moved upstairs to the trust
department of the bank for administration as a part of his testamentary
plan.
General dissatisfaction with these consequences constrained the
legislature, through Senate Bill 63 as we have seen, to retreat some-
what from the flat prohibition adopted in 1943, and permit Missouri
administration of intangibles under certain conditions. Section 466.010,
11. KICA. GiN. STAT. § 59-1701 (1949). In re Lowe's Estate, 155 Kan. 679, 127 P.
2d 512 (1942), construed this statute to prohibit transmittal of Kansas-administered
property to Missouri banks as trustees.
CONFLICT OF LAWS1954]
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which is set forth in the margin1 2 permits administration of "stocks,
bonds, credits or choses in action ... upon a showing to the court by
any legatee under, or executor named in, the will of such decedent
that by such will a legacy is left, outright or in trust, to a natural
person residing in Missouri, or to a corporation, including a national or
state bank or trust company having its chief office, . . .in this state."
Upon a showing that a legacy is left to a Missourian administration
may be had; there is no other condition. The testator need not request
Missouri administration in his will or name an executor to act in Mis-
12. § 466.010, as repealed and re-enacted by Mo. Laws 1951, p. 882, reads as
follows:
"Section 466.010. Administration of estates of non-resident decedent--when
granted. No letters testamentary or of administration shall be granted upon the
estate of any decedent non-resident as to any shares of stock, bonds, credits or choses
in action except upon the application of a creditor within this state or upon the
showing to the court by an ancillary administrator within this state that the lands
and other personal property of such decedent within this state wil not be sufficient
to discharge the debts of such estate or upon a showing to the court by any legatee
under, or executor named in, the will of such decedent that by such will a legacy
is left, outright or in trust, to a natural person residing in Missouri, or to a corpora-
tion, including a national or state bank or trust company having its chief office and
principal place of business in this state. Such application or showing shall be made
to the Probate Court of the county in Missouri in which letters testamentary or of
administration might otherwise be granted, within a period of six (6) months after
the date of death of such decedent, or in the event an order granting or refusing
letters is made upon the estate of such decedent at his domicile, then such appli-
cations may be made any time within six (6) months after the date of that order.
Unless before the expiration of such period of time an executor, administrator
or ancillary administrator appointed within this state, pursuant to application or
showing as herein provided, has made a demand for transfer, payment or delivery
upon the issuer, obligor or debtor, or person in possession, of such shares of stocks,
bonds, credits or choses in action, may be transferred, paid or delivered to or in the
name of his order, or to the heirs if such deceased died intestate, or to the legatee, dis-
tributee or other person entitled thereto; and the person, firm or corporation or agents
thereof making such transfer, payment or delivery shall not be liable for the debts of
or claims against any such decedent or his estate by reason of having made such trans-
fer, payment or delivery. Any letters granted upon the application of a creditor under
the terms of this section shall be revoked immediately upon showing to the court the
satisfaction in any manner of the debt upon which such application was granted,
together with all other claims, and debts filed on or before the date of such
satisfaction and the payment of all costs and fees of such proceeding. Any such
administration proceeding commenced in this state upon the application and showing
of any legatee under, or executor named in, the will of such decedent, shall proceed
to conclusion as in other administration proceedings in this state, and after the
payment of all costs of such administration proceeding, and of all claims duly allowed
therein against such estate, and of all legacies given by such will, outright, or in
trust to natural persons residing in this state and to corporations, including national
or state banks and trust companies, having their chief offices and principal places
of business in this state, if such assets be sufficient therefor, and if not, then so far
as such assets will extend, any balance remaining shall be paid and delivered over
either to the foreign domiciliary executor or administrator, if any, or to the legatees
under decedent's will, or if decedent left no will, to the heirs or other persons entitled
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souri. The opportunity to administer in Missouri is, however, confined to
testate estates in which a Missourian is interested and intestate estates
cannot have the benefits of the law. In this respect the law is too limited.
If the hypothetical Missouri merchant previously referred to as having
his home across the state line fails to leave a legacy to a Vfissourian, or
executes no will at all, the arbitrary mode of administering his Missouri
assets described above continues in effect. This obvious deficiency could
be remedied either by a simple amendment to the current law or by
adoption of legislation similar to that in Kansas or Illinois, both of which
permit ancillary administration in testate and intestate cases. 13
Such then is the present condition of the Missouri statute relating to
administration of intangibles of a non-resident. Exactly what property
is within the jurisdiction of Missouri so as to be administerable under
the statute, and the full faith and credit to be given such administrations,
will be considered in succeeding portions of this article.
II. WHAT MAY BE ADMINISTERED Ix IssouRI: SITus OF
IWTAGIBLES
Where a will qualifies an estate for Missouri administration under
Section 466.010, the administration will be had upon real estate and
tangible personal property as a matter of course. It will also include all
intangible personal property of the decedent within Missouri's juris-
diction. That is, we need not stop to inquire whether the statutory
itemization of "stock, bonds, credits or choses in action" includes every
possible intangible. If there be any item of intangible property not
covered, it is still subject to administration in Missouri, because the
scheme of Section 466.010 is to cut down the jurisdiction of probate
courts by excluding administration only upon the quoted items unless
the qualifying conditions are met. Any items not designated are unaffect-
ed by the section, leaving general jurisdiction over them intact.
The problem, therefore, becomes one of determining what intan-
gible property of a non-resident decedent will be deemed within
the jurisdiction of Missouri, or more generally, when is such property
deemed within the jurisdiction of any state for administration purposes.
A. Situs Generally
Some exploratory observations regarding the nature of the problem
13. KAN. Gsr. STAT. § 59-802 (1949); ILL. Am . STAT. Ch. 3, § 241 (Smith-Hurd,
1953). And see Part V infra.
1954]
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of jurisdiction over intangible property are in order. It is usually said
that a personal representative has power to collect and administer upon
assets extending throughout but not beyond the state which appoints
him.' 4 True, he may in addition be granted certain extra-territorial
powers and rights by the statutes of other states, but any such grant is
clearly by sufferance of the foreign state.15
Now it is deceptively simple to say that the power of an administrator
extends to property "within" his state. An intangible frequently has
points of legal contact in several states. A promissory note may be
kept in State A, while the promissee or endorsee lives in State B and
the maker in State C. Similarly a certificate of corporate stock may be
kept in State A, while the owner lives in State B and the corporation is
organized and does business in State C. In multi-state situations of this
type careful analysis of jurisdiction of the respective governments in-
volved is required. "Jurisdiction" is used here in the sense of the whole
exercisable power of a state lodged in the legislature and in the courts.
Distinctions between legislative and judicial jurisdiction are not imme-
diately pertinent.
Special attention should be given to the role of the situs concept
in the process of determining jurisdiction. Courts have traditionally
deduced jurisdiction over an item from the situs of the item. In the
case of a tangible that approach is natural, for the authority of the
court where the tangible is located can hardly be disputed.10 It is a
judicial fact of life, springing from the obvious power of that court to
control and dispose of it through the physical effects of its writs. When
judges come to the consideration of intangible items they continue to
use the concept of situs, even while observing that an intangible has no
real location. A fictional situs is attached to a given intangible; for the
14. E.g. Vaughan v. Northup, 15 Pet. 1 (U.S. 1841); Emmons v. Gordon, 140 Mo.
490, 41 S.W. 998 (1897); In the matter of Ames Estate, 52 Mo. 290 (1873); Mo. REv.
STAT. §§ 462.010, 462.020 (1949). There can be no doubt of the right of a state to
administer upon real property within its borders nor, as will be seen infra, is there
any doubt about its right to administer upon local tangible personal property.
15. Cf. those given foreign representatives by Mo. Ra,. STAT. § 466.010 (1949).
16. United States v. Guaranty Trust Company, 293 U.S. 340, 345-346 (1934);
Green v. Van Buskirk, 5 Wall. 307 (U.S. 1866); Exceptions in cases of property in
transitu or brought fraudulently within the jurisdiction need not be considered here.
An exception of interest, however, is that of warehoused goods for which a negotiable
warehouse receipt has been issued. By virtue of its statutes permitting the goods to
be represented by the paper, the state of situs has, in such a case, relinquished its
jurisdiction to deal with them, and the goods are, or should be, no longer subject to
attachment, garnishment or administration except through seizure or possession of
the paper.
8
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particular purpose 17 now under discussion-administration of the dece-
dent's property (or more generally, jurisdiction in rem)-situs is of
neccessity assigned to the jurisdiction which can control the intangible.
Thus it is said that personal property ". ... whether tangible or intan-
gible is considered located for the purpose of administration in the
territory of that state whose law must furnish the remedies or its
reduction to possession."' 8 The Supreme Court has recently observed:
"Jurisdiction over an intangible can indeed only arise from
control or power over the persons whose relationships are the
source of the rights and obligations."' 9
It will be discovered that general statements such as those quoted
are subject to further refinement. Negotiable instruments and stock
certificates are often permitted to be administered where they are
found-not where the debtor, or the corporation, may be domiciled. In
such cases the state having the basic jurisdiction (by virtue of its
control over the person involved) has, by allowing the issuance of such
freely circulating business media, released its control over the intan-
gible and agreed to recognize the owner of the paper, as determined by
the law where the paper is, as the owner of the intangible.
Situs, giving rise to jurisdicition, must be read as a shorthand
symbol for effective control. (This statement holds equally for tangibles
and intangibles.) A legal relationship such as a debt truly has no location
in space, but nevertheless only certain courts have power to control
and enforce that relationship. 20 There can be no objection if the opinions
choose to call that power situs. 21
Ideally, limits of jurisdiction of a state over property should be
17. For other purposes, e.g. assessment of personal property taxes, situs of an
intangible may be said to be at the residence of the owner.
18. 2 WoERma, A .m LAw oF Ama. § 205 (3rd ed. 1923).
19. Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 548 (1948) (a divorce case).
20. In the case of a debt, only the state which can serve the debtor with effective
personal process can reduce it to judgment. That state has jurisdiction to administer
upon it, or, in the case of a quasi in rem action commenced by attachment, to dis-
charge it. Depending upon the fortuitous movements of the debtor, any state might
have an opportunity to serve him personally; his domicile, however, can through
substituted service constitutionally obtain a valid judgment regardless of his move-
ments. This explains a common rule that the situs of a debt is at the debtor's
domicile. The domicile may, of course, voluntarily cede its jurisdiction to other states
by permitting the issuance of negotiable instruments, bonds, debentures or deposit
certificates, thereby agreeing that the instrument shall embody the debt to such
an extent that the law which governs the instrument necessarily governs the debt.
Cf. Part III-D infra.
21. See Note, 39 HAv. L. RPv. 485-489 (1926); Carpenter, Jurisdiction over
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drawn so that with respect to any given item of property, one state and
only one will have the basic right either to administer it or permit its
administration elsewhere. If the ideal is not always possible of realization,
and two states are deemed to have concurrent jurisdiction over an item,
a rule to confer exclusive power upon one court, perhaps the one first
assuming jurisdiction, should be adopted. Some such modus operandi
appears essential to avoid head-on conflicts in the disposition of the
decedent's property. Illustrative of such conflicts would be the case
where the court of one state directs the sale of a bond to pay administra-
tion expenses, and the court of another state decrees distribution of the
same bond, in kind, to heirs or legatees, or where different courts make
conflicting determinations of the persons entitled to receive distribution.-22
These considerations show plainly that it is not for a state to
establish the furthermost reach of its own power over property. Self-
determination of jurisdiction would be incompatible with the existence
of other sovereigns. An authority on wills has formulated the following
expression of the thought:
"A state may assert power to decide the title to a thing and
what disposition is to be made of it. . . . Such assertion of
power is generally said to be a claim of jurisdiction. If other
states and nations generally regard [its] judgments, orders,
and decrees as final and conclusive we say that the first state has
jurisdiction.... The existence and extent of jurisdiction thus
depend rather on what the other states concede than on what the
state in question claims."'2
3
Normally, conflicting claims of jurisdiction to administer property
do not offer practical difficulties. In the first place, lawyers often fail
to press the points involved. Secondly, courts and legislatures rarely
attempt to overstep their traditional bounds in these matters, out of a
proper respect for the interests of their sister states. If, however, a
satisfactory adjustment of jurisdictional claims is not possible at the
state level, the ultimate arbiter is the United States Supreme Court.
2 4
22. Conflicting determinations of certain facts, such as domicile in divorce and
probate cases are frequently left unresolved by the Supreme Court. See e.g. Williams
v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945); Worcester County Trust Company v. Riley,
302 U.S. 292 (1937). However, conflicting determinations of jurisdiction over an item
of property are not analogous, and the Supreme Court does resolve them, normally
through the medium of the full faith and credit clause. See Part IV infra.
23. 2 PAGE ON W=rLS, § 559 (1926).
24. Iowa v. Slimmer, 248 U.S. 155 (1918); Baker v. Baker, Eccles and Co., 242
U.S. 394 (1917); RESTATEmENT, CON'LICT oF LAws, § 43, Comment a (1934).
[V'ol. 19
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The opinions of that Court are therefore of primary authority, and should
be emphasized accordingly.
Views of the United States Supreme Court
The Supreme Court has had opportunity to express views upon
the proper place for administration of many types of intangibles. In
the case of a deposit in a New York bank belonging to a decedent
domiciled in Illinois the Supreme Court has said:
"1... it is plain that the transfer [by will] does depend upon
the law of New York, not because of any theoretical speculation
concerning the whereabouts of the debt, but because of the
practical fact of its power over the person of the debtor . . .
"Power over the person of the debtor confers jurisdiction,
we repeat. And this being so, we perceive no better reason for
denying the right of New York to impose the succession tax on
debts owed by its citizens than upon tangible chattels found
within the state at the time of the death. The maxim mobilia
sequuntur personam has no more truth in the one case than in
the other. '25
Although the court was deciding that New York could impose an inherit-
ance tax on the bank account, it did so by finding first that New York
had general jurisdiction over it. The rationale of the decision therefore
has pertinence to the present discussion. 6
Of an ordinary debt, the Supreme Court has held that the domicile
of the debtor and not of the decedent has jurisdiction to administer it.27
But in the case of negotiable instruments and United States bonds, juris-
dicition looks to the actual situs of the instrument. It was so held in
Iowa v. Slimmer,28 where the slant of the facts might well have drawn
the court to decide that notes and bonds were administerable at the
decedent's domicile only. The State of Iowa had asked leave to file a
bill in the Supreme Court against the State of Minnesota and others.
Its grounds were that an Iowa resident during the period before his
death had conspired with some of the defendants to defraud the State of
25. Blackstone v. Miller, 188 U.S. 189, 205 and 206 (1902), a case which has been
reinvigorated by State Tax Commission v. Aldrich, 316 U.S. 174 (1942).
26. See also Pennington v. Fourth National Bank, 243 U.S. 269, 271 (1917), where,
speaking of a bank account, the court said:
"The Fourteenth Amendment did not in guaranteeing due process of law, abridge
the jurisdiction which a state possessed over property within its borders, regardless
of the residence or presence of the owner. That jurisdiction extends alike to tangible
and intangible property."
27. Wyman v. Halstead, 109 U.S. 654 (1884).
28. 248 U.S. 115 (1918).
11
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Iowa of inhertance taxes by arranging with them to keep his promissory
notes and United States bonds in Minnesota. The decedent's will was
probated in Minnesota and administration was there had upon the notes
and bonds. Iowa asked a determination that it, as the conceded domicile
of the decedent, had jurisdiction to administer upon his property, and
Minnesota did not. The Supreme Court denied leave to file the bill,
saying, per Brandeis, J.:
"Regardless of the domicil of the decedent, these notes and
bonds are subject to probate proceedings in that state [irme-
sota] ... its court had power either to distribute property located
there according to the terms of the will applicable thereto, or to
direct that it be transmitted to the personal representative of
the decedent at the place of his domicil to be disposed of by
him."s2 9
This holding directly disposed of the proceeding, the Court saying:
".... It presents a conclusive reason why leave to file the bill of
complaint should be denied." 30
Neither should there be overlooked the important case of Baker v.
Baker, Eccles & Co. 31 wherein Kentucky and Tennessee each judicially
determined it was the domicile of the decedent and made conflicting
distributions of stock in a Kentucky corporation. The Tennessee dis-
tributee sued in Kentucky for the shares, asking that full faith and
credit be given the Tennessee proceeding; Kentucky refused relief.82 On
appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the Tennessee distributee's
fundamental contention was that the personal estate of a decedent is a
legal unit, having its situs at the owner's domicile, and the title to the
whole of it wherever situate was vested in the duly qualified domiciliary
administrator. This contention was absolutely rejected. The court noted
that the property in controversy was shares in a Kentucky corporation
29. Id. at 120-121.
30. Id. at 120. See also New England Mutual Life Insurance Company v. Wood-
ward, 111 U.S. 138 (1884) (insurance proceeds administerable where the policy itself
is, not at domicile.)
31. 242 U.S. 394 (1917).
32. 162 Ky. 683, 173 S.W. 109 (1915).
12
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 1 [1954], Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol19/iss1/6
CONFLICT OF LAWS
"having no situs outside of its own state so far as appears,"3 3 and held
that the Tennessee judgments had no effect upon them.3 4
Baker and Slimmer left little reason to think that intangibles
are to be treated differently than tangibles or real estate for the purpose
of granting administration. In these and other cases discussed supra,
the Supreme Court has upheld the power of the situs state to administer
upon intangibles.
The Court's views are not to be considered as novel or unusual.
They are drawn directly from the common law, as is most conveniently
shown, perhaps by the Court's earliest statements of the matter, in
1831, when Mr. Justice Johnson, in a comprehensive dictum, outlined
the course of the common law in subjecting intangible property to letters
of administration. By ample citation of authorities, he demonstrated that
contract debts in England had situs with the debtor, bonds and specialties
had situs where the instruments were and judgments had situs where
rendered-all independent of the domicile of the owner-and would
be administerable where so located. This branch of the Court's opinion
concludes:
"In point of fact, it cannot be questioned, that goods thus
found within the limits of a sovereign's jurisdiction, are subject
to his laws; it would be an absurdity, in terms, to affirm the
contrary .... ,,35
B. Domicile as a Test of Jurisdiction: JMobilia
Sequuntur Personam
Attention should be addressed to the meaning of the maxim mobitia
sequuntur personam as it bears on the present question. This maxim, of
remote origin, may have been used at one time to identify all personal
property with the person of its owner. The Supreme Court has said:
"The old rule, expressed in the maxim mobilia sequuntur
personam by which personal property was regarded as subject
33. Baker v. Baker, Eccles & Co., 242 U.S. 394 at 400 (1917).
34. The headnote of the case contains language even broader than that in the
opinion, thus: (Id. at 394)
"Each State has the power to control and administer the personal assets of an
intestate found within her borders, such as debts due from a local corporation or
the shares of its stock, to satisfy the rights of her own citizens in the distribution of
such assets.
"No State, therefore, has the power, by probate or other proceedings in rem,
to fix the status as to administration, and determine the course of devolution, of
personal property of an intestate situate beyond her borders and within the domain
of another state."
35. Smith v. Union Bank, 5 Pet. 518, 526 (U.S. 1831).
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to the law of the owner's domicil, grew up in the Middle
Ages, when movable property consisted chiefly of gold and
jewels, which could be easily carried by the owner from place
to place, or secreted in spots known only to himself. In modern
times, since the great increase in amount and variety of personal
property, not immediately connected with the person of the
owner, that rule has yielded more and more to the iex situs, the
law of the place where the property is kept and used."36
The ecclesiastical and common law of England was that administra-
tion of a decedent's property was correctly had only at its location,
regardless of the decedent's domicile. The court of situs, however, by
comity applied to movables the law of succession of the domicile so
that the entire personal estate wherever located was distributed as an
entirety to the persons and in the proportions designated by the law of
the domicile. 37 Application of the domiciliary succession law is still
almost universal. Missouri has adopted it by statute8 as have many other
states. It is instructive to note, however, that a few jurisdictions do not
look to the domiciliary law. Illinois, prior to 1940,39 and Mississippi yet
today40 have not followed the usual rule. Their statutes have required
that personal property in the state be distributed to heirs determined
under local laws and not by the law of the domicile. Thus it has been held
by the Mississippi court that stock in a Mississippi corporation owned
by a resident of Minnesota devolves according to the intestate law of
Mississippi.4 '
Despite local departure from the rule, the idea of a universal succes-
sion according to the law of the domicile is a fairly fixed concept in our
36. Pullman's Palace Car Company v. Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. 18, 22 (1891).
37. For a summation of this rule and of ancillary administration as it developed
in the ecclesiastical courts of England see Buchanan and Myers, The Administration
of Intangibles in View of First National Bank v. Maine, 48 HAav. L. Rav. 911-915
(1935).
38. Mo. Ry. STAT. § 466.080 (1949).
39. ILL. ANNV. STAT. Chap. 39, § 1 (1934), repealed effective Jan. 1, 1940. Compare
Headen v. Cohn, 292 11. 210, 126 N.E. 550 (1920) (affirming distribution under
Illinois law) with Schultz v. Chicago City Bank & Trust Co., 284 Ill. 148, 51 N.E. 2nd
140 (1943) (affirming distribution under the usual conflicts rule, after repeal of
statute).
40. Miss. CoDE Title 5, Ch. 1, § 467 (1942).
41. Ewing v. Warren, 144 Miss. 233, 109 So. 601 (1926).
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jurisprudence; it is in this sense that mobilia sequuntur personam states
the accepted rule.42
Not always have courts clearly distinguished between the propriety
of administering at the situs, and the propriety of applying in that
administration the succession law of the domicile. In an 1869 opinion,
Wilkins v. Ellett,4 3 the Supreme Court used language illustrative of the
possible confusion. The question was whether payment of a debt in
Tennessee to an Alabama administrator was good as against a sub-
sequently appointed administrator in Tennessee. 1r. Justice Nelson said:
"It has long been settled, and is a principle of universal
jurisprudence, in all civilized nations, that the personal estate
of the deceased is to be regarded, for the purposes of succession
and distribution, wherever situated, as having no other locality
than that of his domicile; and, if he dies intestate, the succession
is governed by the law of the place where he was domiciled at
the time of his decease, and not by the conflicting laws of the
various places where the property happened at the time to be
situated.... The original administrator, therefore, with letters
taken out at the place of the domicil, is invested with the title to
all the personal property of the deceased. . . !,44 (Emphasis
supplied.)
He viewed the need for ancillary administration as arising out of the
domiciliary representative's incapacity to sue in another state, and not
from his lack of title. Since the Alabama administrator was appointed at
the domicile (as the court assumed), his title was unimpeachable and
payment to him was held good acquittance. The actual holding was
sustainable on other grounds, but the generous dictum enfolding it was
opposed by logic, tradition, and the Court's own prior holdings.4 5
Fortunately, the ligitants in Wilkins v. Ellett were unabashed by the
opinion, and after a new trial the identical case came back some fourteen
years later for a second decision.46 The jury finding on the second trial
revealed an erroneous assumption in the previous opinion, in this:
42. ". . . It is this ... that gives whatever meaning it has to the saying mobilia
sequuntur personam!" Holmes, J., in Blackstone v. Miller, 188 U.S. 189, 204 (1902).
But cf. the anomalous view taken by the Kansas Supreme Court In Re Rogers
Estate, 164 Kan. 492, 190 P. 2d 857 (1948). There the court, assuming arguendo that
an indemnity insurance policy was property, felt that there was no power in the
Kansas Probate Court to administer upon it because the decedent was a non-resident.
43. 9 Wall. 740 (U.S. 1869).
44. Id. at 741.
45. Vaughan v. Northup, 15 Pet. 1 (U.S. 1841); Smith v. Union Bank, 5 Pet. 518
(U.S. 1831).
46. Wilkins v. Ellet, 108 U.S. 256 (1883).
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Although the payment was made in Tennessee to an Alabama administra-
tor, Tennessee was the domicile. It now appeared that the Supreme
Court in the first case had decided in favor of an ancillary administrator
as against the claim of one appointed at the domicile. Nevertheless, the
second opinion held that the payment to the ancillary Alabama admin-
istrator was still a good acquittance, a result which undermines Mr.
Justice Nelson's doctrine of world-wide title in the domiciliary repre-
sentative. Despite Wilkins II, Wilkins I is at times carelessly cited as
establishing the domicile as a preferred place for administration. There
is no countenance for such a position. The subsequent Supreme Court
cases discussed above have firmly established the jurisdiction of the
court of situs. Tilt v. Kelsey47 and Riley v. New York Trust Company48
are also confirmatory. In the latter case, where the situs of the decedent's
corporate stock was stipulated to be in Delaware and the only question
was whether domicile was in New York or Georgia, the Court said:
"Her [Delaware] sovereignty determines personal and prop-
erty rights within her territory. Subject to constitutional limita-
tions, it was her prerogative to distribute the property located in
Delaware or to direct its transmission to the domiciliary repre-
sentative of the deceased." 49
The Restatement" concurs generally. It provides for administration
of a chattel at its location,51 permits payment of a debt to any of several
administrators in addition to the domiciliary administrator, 2 and pro-
vides for the administration of a corporate share by the administrator in
possession of the certificate.53
In view of the authorities, it must be concluded that the maxim
mobilia sequuntur personam has no modem application except to describe
the general rule by which domiciliary law is applied in the forum to
determine heirship. It has never been the law in the United States that
the domicile has some peculiar paramount right whereby it may admin-
ister upon all of a decedent's personal property wherever located. The
Supreme Court has rejected every attempt to give the domicile a superior
status in this regard. It has adhered to practical limitations on power
47. 207 U.S. 43 (1907).
48. 315 U.S. 343 (1942).
49. Id. at 349.
50. RESTATwEENT, CONnaCT OF LAWS (1934).
51. Id. § 471.
52. Id. § 480.
53. Id. § 477.
[Vol. 19
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handed down from the common law. Jurisdiction over property, tan-
gible or intangible, and whether for purposes of administration or other-
wise, has been found to reside in the court or courts which can success-
fully and effectively control the property, or the persons whose relation-
ships are the subject matter of the property.
In our federal system, the Supreme Court exercises an authority to
allocate power between the several states, which naturally has no coun-
terpart in the interplay of laws of independent sovereigns. It is fortunate
that that power was not used to upset the common law rules of situs-
jurisdiction over intangibles. The difficulty of a domiciliary test of
jurisdiction has become apparent in the constantly increasing volume
of divorce-jurisdicition clashes, epitomized by the Williams litigation. 5 4
Mr. Justice Rutledge has well presented the painful consequences of
adhering to a domicile test of jurisdiction even in "status" cases, such
as divorce, where such a test has been traditional:
"Domicil, as a substantive concept, steadily reflects neither
a policy of permanence nor one of transiency. It rather reflects
both inconstantly. The very name gives forth the idea of home
with all its ancient associations of permanence. But 'home' in
the modern world is often a trailer or a tourist camp. Automo-
biles, nation-wide business and multiple family dwelling units
have deprived the institution, though not the idea, of its former
general fixation to soil and locality. But, beyond this, 'home'
in the domiciliary sense can be changed in the twinkling of an
eye, the time it takes a man to make up his mind to remain where
he is when he is away from home. He need do no more than
decide, by a flash of thought, to stay 'either permanently or for
an indefinite or unlimited length of the time.' No other connec-
tion of permanence is required. All of his belongings, his busi-
ness, his family, his established interests and intimate relations
may remain where they have always been. Yet if he is but
physically present elsewhere, without even bag or baggage, and
undergoes the mental flash, in a moment he has created a new
domicil though hardly a new home.
".... Apart from the necessity for travel, hardly evidentiary
of stabilized relationship in a transient age, the criterion comes
down to a purely subjective mental state, related to remaining
for a length of time never yet defined with clarity.
"With the crux of power fixed in such a variable, small
wonder that the states vacillate in applying it and this Court
54. Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942); Williams v. North Carolina,
325 U.S. 226 (1945). See also Sutton v. Lieb, 342 U.S. 402 (1952).
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ceaselessly seeks without finding a solution for its quandry. But
not all the vice lies in the substantive conception. Only lawyers
know, unless now it is taxpayers and persons divorced, how
rambling is the scope of facts from which proof is ever drawn to
show and negate the ultimate conclusion of subjective 'fact.'
They know, as do the courts and other tribunals which wrestle
with the problem, how easily facts procreative of conflicting
inferences may be marshalled and how conjectural is the out-
come. There is no greater legal gamble. Rare is the situation,
where much is at stake, in which conflicting circumstances can-
not be shown and where accordingly conflicting ultimate infer-
ences cannot be drawn.
"The essentially variable nature of the test lies therefore as
much in the proof and the mode of making the conclusion as in
the substantive conception itself. When what must be proved
is a variable, the proof and the conclusion which follows upon it
inevitably take on that character. The 'unitary domicle-jurisdic-
tional fact-permissible inference' variable not only is an incon-
stant, vacillating pivot for allocating power. It is inherently a
surrender of the power to make the allocation."';
These considerations, written with regard to the domicile of living
persons, must be given more weight where the search is to find the
domicile of a deceased person who cannot be examined. If, by some
precedent-shattering decision, the Supreme Court were to provide for
unitary administration of an estate at the domicile, it would hardly be
possible to foresee all of its consequences. Certainly there would be
conflicting determinations of domicile by the states, more numerous
and more important than ever before, and the resolution of those con-
flicts, each one presenting unique facts, would fall upon the federal
courts, if indeed they would hear the issues.5
Much more practical is the actual operation of our present system.
Situs determination of either tangibles or intangibles does not involve
elusive and subjective fact findings. The facts will be concrete-where
was the certificate held, or, where can the debtor be served-not matters
of intent and "mental flash." The legal principles to be applied to those
concrete facts either can be, or are now, settled without interminable
litigation.
In brief, while it is perfectly appropriate for each state to make its
55. 325 U.S. at 257-259 (1945).
56. Cf. Worcester County Trust Co. v. Riley, 302 U.S. 292, 299 (1937); but see
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own determination of the domicile of a decedent as a stepping-stone to
deciding what it will do with the decedent's property which it controls 57
-it would be inappropriate and a legal nightmare to permit each state,
by determining itself to be the decedent's domicile, to draw unto itself
the control of his property wherever situate in the United States.
C. Situs for Inheritance Tax Purposes
There is no necessary connection between a state's jurisdiction to
administer upon intangibles, and its jurisdiction to levy inheritance
taxes upon them. Nevertheless, it is thought desirable to discuss briefly
the scope of a state's inheritance tax jurisdiction, because it is a topic
often associated with, and compared with, jurisdiction to administer.
The inheritance tax jurisdiction of a state has been the subject of a
long series of Supreme Court decisions. With tangibles the Court has
unwaveringly confined inheritance taxation to the state of situs.58 Intan-
gibles never have received similar treatment. In Blackstone v. Miller5"
the Court held that both the domicile and the situs could tax them, but
a quick succession of cases between 1930 and 1932 overruled that holding,
drawing from the "void of due process"60 a concept that double taxation
of intangibles was prohibited by the Constitution,61 and selecting the
domicile as to the single state having inheritance tax jurisdiction. How-
ever, upon a third look at the problem, the Supreme Court has definitely
re-adopted its first view, and Blackstone v. Miller supra, again states the
law. Two preliminary cases decided in 193962 forecast the return to
Blackstone v. Miller, and in State Tax Commission of Utah v. Aldrich63
the full circle was completed. Due process, it is now clear, is not denied
by the situs in imposing inheritance taxes upon intangibles.
While the Supreme Court in its 1930-32 opinions 4 temporarily
adopted mobilia sequuntur personam as expressing its policy views
in the assessment of inheritance taxes, there is no inkling even in those
57. E.g. Baker v. Baker, Eccles Co. 242 U.S. 394 (1917).
58. Treichler v. Wisconsin, 338 U.S. 251 (1949); Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U.S.
473 (1925).
59. 188 U.S. 189 (1903).
60. Holmes, J., dissenting in Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U.S. 586, 596 (1930).
61. Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v Minnesota, 280 U.S. 204 (1930); Baldwin v. Mis-
souri, 281 U.S. 586 (1930); Biedler v. South Carolina Tax Commission, 282 U.S. 1
(1930); First National Bank v. Maine, 284 U.S. 312 (1932).
62. Curry v. McCandless, 307 U.S. 357 (1939); Graves v. Elliott, 307 U.S. 383
(1939).
63. 316 U.S. 174 (1942).
64. Note 61 supra.
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cases that the domiciliary state was being given a right to administer upon
the intangible.65
Indeed, situs of intangibles for tax purposes could only be relevant
to situs for other purposes if the power to tax was founded solely upon
jurisdiction in rem. It was not so founded even in the overruled 1930-
32 decisions.
Now that the Aldrich case re-establishes the taxing power of any
state having an appropriate connection with the intangible, most state
legislatures have acted to avoid the possibility of double taxation, by
passing reciprocal inheritance tax exemption statutes. These statutes
provide that intangibles of a non-resident shall not be taxed if the
domiciliary state has enacted similar reciprocal legislation, 0 or as in
the case of Missouri, exempts them regardless of the existence of recip-
rocal legislation at the domicile. 7
D. Missouri and Kansas Decisions
In general, Missouri has followed normal rules in determining its
jurisdiction to administer upon tangible and intangible property. Thus
bank deposits and debts due from local debtors are administerable in
Missouri.68 With respect to administration of corporate stock, decisions
of Missouri courts have had a wide influence in development of mercantile
situs rules. That subject will be developed at length in the next portion
of this article.
One Missouri decision should be specifically noted at this point. A
promissory note executed by two makers resident in Jackson County,
Missouri, and apparently negotiable, was kept by the payee at his
domicile in Kansas. After his death the Kansas probate court issued its
decree determining heirship and vesting title to the note in plaintiff's
assignors. Plaintiff sued on the note in Missouri claiming that it was
personal property and under the maxin mobilia sequuntur personam had
administerable situs in Kansas. The Kansas City Court of Appeals held,
on authority of the Crohn case, supra, among others, that the situs of the
note was at the residence of the debtors. The Kansas decree "could not
convey.., title to any property situated in Missouri.""0
The decision is not reconcilable with the mercantile point of view,
65. See Buchanan and Myers, The Administration of Intangibles in View of
First National Bank v. Maine, 48 Hnv. L. REv. 911 (1935).
66. E.g. KAN. GEN. STAT. § 79-1501e (1949).
67. Mo. REv. STAT. § 145.020, Subsec. 3 (1) (1949).
68. E.g. Crohn v. Clay County State Bank, 137 Mo. App. 712, 118 S.W. 498 (1909).
69. Pinet v. Pinet, 230 Mo. App. 500, 191 S.W. 2d 362, 364 (1945).
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as expressed in the Negotiable Instruments Law, that a negotiable note
is property in itself, nor is the decision reconcilable with Iowa v. Slimmer,
supra, in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that a
promissory note is administerable where the note is.7o An examination
of the record and briefs in the case shows that Iowa v. Slimmer was
probably not called to the attention of the court. Plaintiff did not even
invoke Section 272, 71 the forerunner of the current Section 466.010, which
apparently would have given him an absolute right to recovery. In fact
the court commented upon the omission in ruling for the defendant. 72
The Kansas decisions are unlike those of Missouri or any other
jurisdiction. At one time a mercantile approach was suggested by the
Kansas Supreme Court. In Ames v. Citizens National Bank73 the right
to administer upon a certificate of deposit issued by a Kansas bank was in
issue. While the decision was for the New Mexico domiciliary executor,
the case contains a broad intimation that if the Kansas ancillary admin-
istrator had had possession of the certificate, he would have been entitled
to administer upon it.
Kansas law relating to situs of stocks for purposes of administration
is unsettled. In re Miller's Estate7 4 arose when a decedent held certifi-
cates of stock in a Kansas corporation at his residence in Missouri. The
court found Kansas administration improper because, it said, the shares
were located at the residence of the decendent. It is uncertain whether
the holding of this case is affected by a provision in the 1939 Corporation
Code, that situs of shares in a Kansas corporation shall be deemed situate
in Kansas "for all purposes of title, action, attachment, garnishment and
jurisdiction of all courts in this state.""5 Also uncertain is the effect,
in turn, of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act,7 6 adopted in 1947, upon the
situs provision of the Corporation Code.
A Kansas case involving treatment of notes, Moore v. Jordan," is of
70. And see 3 BEAL, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 471.8 (1935), where it is said:
"It has been almost uniformly held that a foreign administrator who succeeds to
possession of the note may assign it so as to enable the assignee to sue on it in the
state where the maker is domiciled."
71. Mo. REv. STAT. (1939).
72. 191 S.W. 2d at 364 (1945). See Becker v. Buder, 185 F. 2d 311 (8th Cir. 1950),
af-irming 88 F. Supp. 609 (E.D. Mo. 1949) and holding that Mo. REv. STAT. § 272
(1939) gave a right to the foreign administrator or distributee to sue for intangibles
in Missouri.
73. 105 Kan. 83, 181 Pac. 564 (1919).
74. 90 Kan. 819, 136 Pac. 255 (1913).
75. KAN. GEN. STAT. § 17-3218 (1949).
76. Id. §§ 17-4801 et seq.
77. 36 Kan. 271, 13 Pac. 337 (1887).
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interest because of the analysis of the court. There a Kansas debtor
had executed notes to the decedent. At death the notes were in Colo-
rado. The issue of the decedent's domicile as between Colorado and
Illinois was hotly contested in the Kansas court, and the jury found the
domicile to be in Illinois. On this set of facts the nimbleness of the
Kansas court was remarkable. It used Wyman v. Halstead78 (a debt is
administerable at the debtor's domicile) to show that the Colorado admin-
istrator was not entitled. It then used the language of the first Wilkins v.
Ellett7 (the domicile has a "superior" right) to show that between
Illinois and Kansas, the Illinois administrator was entitled.
These views were reiterated in 1930,80 but in 1948 the Kansas court
delivered itself of a dictum much more sweeping, saying:
"This court has long recognized the irreconcilable conflict
which exists on the subject of personal property for the purpose
of administration [citing cases]. This court early made its choice
of doctrine on that subject and has consistently adhered to it.
As applied to administration of estates we are committed to the
doctrine that the situs of personal property is transitory prior to
the death of its owner and follows the owner wherever he may
be, but that after his death the situs becomes fixed and local at
the place of his domicile." 8'
The case arose when a resident of North Carolina died with a public
liability insurance policy on which there were claims resulting from a
Kansas collision. Whether or not the policy was an asset of the decedent's
estate was not decided, the court preferring to rest its decision on whether
the alleged asset was in Kansas or at the domicile of the decedent. As
shown by the quoted language, the decision was that the policy, if an
asset, had its situs in North Carolina. Whether the decision is really
based upon an insistent pursuit of mobilia sequuntur personam, or upon
policy matters not fully explicated, is not crystal clear. For example, the
court later in the opinion says:
"A conclusion that this indemnity policy constitutes 'estate'
left by the nonresident decedent to be administered in Marshall
county would mean this policy constitutes 'estate' which may
be administered in any county in Kansas and in any county of
every other state of the union, with a similar statute, in which
78. Note 27 supra.
79. Note 43 supra.
80. Toner v. Conqueror Trust Company, 131 Kan. 651, 293 Pac. 745 (1930).
81. In re Rogers Estate, 164 Kan. 492, 190 P. 2d 857, 860-861 (1948).
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the insurer is authorized to transact business. We do not think
the statute was intended to produce such a result."82
We cannot further inquire why the Kansas court felt it necessary
to reach its conclusion in the Rogers case by adopting an impractical
and meaningless rule of law-mobilia sequuntur personam--"a rule not
true either as a matter of fact or legal doctrine."83 Prior decisions did
not seem to require it, and in fact the Kansas Court itself, eight years
previously in a tax case, had recognized the necessity of departing "from
the ancient rule of mobilia sequuntur personam,"8 4 saying:
"Such a departure was made almost inevitable by the great
economic changes that came in the modern world. In ancient
days the average individual possessed few chattels and these
were of comparatively simple character. When he moved on
to other climes he customarily took his 'movables' with him.
Accordingly, a presumption, hardening into a conclusion of law,
arose that in all cases he had actually done so. Hence, when the
sovereign had jurisdiction of the individual he had jurisdiction
of the 'mobilia' wherever located. But time marched on, and
simplicity of life gave way to complexity. Mobilia became of
infinite variety and character. Frequently they have become so
localized that it would be fantastic for the law to treat them as
having wholly followed the owner to another state where he
resides."85
Broadly speaking, what the Kansas court has currently done is
this: It has refused to exercise its jurisdiction to administer upon many
items of property. It has preferred instead to forward them to the
domiciliary state for administration and as a legal crutch has used the
mobilia doctrine. It is entirely within the power of Kansas to do this.
The rule probably will convenience domiciliary administrators, but no
doubt will inconvenience those Kansas creditors and legatees who, as a
result, will have to file their claims in foreign courts.
Observe that Kansas has never, in any case, attempted to apply the
mobilia doctrine in reverse, i. e., to deny authority of other states to
conduct ancillary administration on the personal estates of Kansas domi-
ciliaries. Kansas could not so apply its law, if it wished, where the
82. Id. at 862.
83. GOODRICH, Coskaicm or LAWS 473 (2d ed. 1938). "The most such a statement
does is to put the legal conclusion . . . a we're here because we're here sort of
exegesis." (Id. p. 480).
84. Russell v. Cogswell, 151 Kan. 14, 98 P. 2d 179, 183 (1940).
85. Id. at 183-184.
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United States Supreme Court has pronounced ancillary administration
proper.8 6
It is of interest to compare the Kansas and Missouri approaches
with that of Illinois, which has avoided judicial speculation by enacting
broad statutes covering the subject. In Illinois ancillary letters will
issue upon an estate of a non-resident unless the probate court is
satisfied that no inheritance taxes will be due and all claims are paid, and
the parties in interest desire to settle the estate without administration in
Illinois.8 7 -As for what may be administered in an Illinois ancillary admin-
istration, the statute specifies the criteria for determining situs, and
whole-heartedly embraces the mercantile theory of situs:
"For the purpose of granting administration of both testate
and intestate estates of non-resident decedents, the situs of tan-
gible personal estate is where it is located and the situs of intan-
gible personal estate is where the instrument evidencing a debt,
obligation, stock or chose in action happens to be, or where the
debtor resides, if there is no instrument evidencing the debt,
obligation or chose in action in this state."88
HIL. Srus o CoRPoRATE SAREs: DEVELOPMENT OF THE
MERCANTILE THEORY
A. Development in the Absence of Statutes
Determination of situs of corporate stock for administration pur-
poses may become an intricate problem. Situs might be claimed by
any of several jurisdictions-the state of incorporation, the decedent's
domicile, the place where the certificate is kept, or, though no authority
supports it, the state where the corporate assets are.8 9
It was early held that the state of incorporation had a pre-eminent
claim to jurisdiction over the shares.90 The United States Supreme
Court adopted that general view in a 1900 decision, Jellenik v. Huron
Copper Mining Company,91 holding that an action to remove a cloud
on title to shares, quasi in rem, was properly brought where incorpora-
tion took place, where the shares were transferable only on the books
of the corporation. The decision was influential in cases of decedent's
86. See Part IV infra.
87. ILL. ANN. STAT. Ch. 3, § 241 (Smith-Hurd, 1941).
88. Id. § 207.
89. See Rhode Island Trust Co. v. Doughton, 270 U.S. 69 (1926) (presence of
assets does not mean presence of shares, in a tax case).
90. For a collection of administration cases with that dominant holding see 72
A.L.R. 179 (1931).
91. 177 U.S. 1 (1900).
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estates. The Missouri Supreme Court in partial reliance upon Jellenik
once held that the only place where shares in Missouri corporation could
be administered was in Missouri.92
This viewpoint was bolstered in the Baker case9 3 where the situs
of the shares in controversy was assumed to be in the state of incorpora-
tion "so far as appears."9 4 However, a sharp change of theory was
indicated by the Supreme Court in 1925, in Direction der Disconto-
Gesellschaft v. United States Steel," a case which because it involved a
transfer outside the United States did not even have the helpful under-
pinning of the full faith and credit clause. Stock certificates of a New
Jersey corporation were expropriated in England during the first World
War as enemy assets, and held and transferred by the British alien-
property trustee. The German owners sued the corporation and the
trustee after conclusion of hostilities, but the Supreme Court refused
the argument that the shares were not subject to British power. Mr.
Justice Holmes, speaking for the Court, analyzed the jurisdiction of the
British authorities as follows:
"Therefore New Jersey having authorized that corporation
like others to issue certificates that so far represent the stock
that ordinarily at least no one can get the benefits of ownership
except through and by means of the paper, it recognizes as owner
anyone to whom the person declared by the paper to be owner
has transferred it by the endorsement provided for wherever it
takes place. It allows an indorsement in blank, and by its law as
well as by the law of England an indorsement in blank authorizes
anyone who is the lawful owner of the paper to write in a name,
and thereby entitle the person so named to demand registration
as owner in his turn upon the corporation's books. But the ques-
tion who is the owner of the paper depends upon the law of the
place where the paper is."96
There is little doubt but that the Supreme Court would have reached
the same conclusion in the case of a foreign executor in possession of the
certificates, whose position in every essential respect is like that of the
British trustee.07
92. Troll v. Third National Bank of St. Louis, 278 Mo. 74, 211 S.W. 545 (1919).
See the fuller discussion in Section 1II C, infra.
93. Baker v. Baker, Eccles & Co., 242 U.S. 894 (1917).
94. Id. at 400.
95. 267 U.S. 22 (1925).
96. Id. at 28.
97. The Missouri Supreme Court felt no doubt. See Lohman v. Kansas City
Southern Pailway, 326 Mo. 819, 33 S.W. 2d 112 (1930) discussed infra.
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A number of state courts of last resort must, on the basis of past
decisions, be classified as holding that the state of incorporation is the
proper one for administration.98 However, those holdings were prior
to general adoption of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act-a statute which
gives promise of consolidating the mercantile viewpoint of stock trans-
fers everywhere, and which will be discussed at length in a later section.0
Also, important corporate jurisdictions such as New York and
Delaware have reached the mercantile viewpoint without the aid of
statutes, and have sanctioned administration upon the certificate, regard-
less of domicile or state of incorporation.
Despite contrary language in earlier cases, notably New York Trust
Company v. Riley, 00 Delaware has recognized the propriety of admin-
istering upon stock of its corporations solely through possession of the
certificate. In Bowles v. R. G. Dun-Bradstreet Corporation,'' a Rhode
Island resident died owning shares of stock in the defendant Delaware
coroporation. His New York ancillary executors held the certificates.
The court noted that the generality of statement indulged in the New
York Trust Company case, supra, and in the first Wilkins case, 102 to the
effect that the domicile has some kind of superior title and position in the
administration of a decedent's estate, ..... will not bear a careful analysis
in all of its aspects.... In fact, the strict legal rights and powers of the
executor or administrator of a deceased person are confined to the
territorial limits of the state appointing him, and this is true whether he
be a domiciliary or an ancillary representative."'' 0 3 It was held that the
corporation should transfer the shares at the instance of the New York
ancillary executors in possession of the certificates.
In Ne.w York, it has beeli settled since 1913 that the place of the
certificate may have jurisdiction to administer the shares. The New York
Court of Appeals so ruled in Lockwood v. United States Steel,104 a
leading case. The Bermuda decedent owned certificates of stock in a
98. Note 90 supra.
99. See I B infra.
100. 24 Del. Ch. 354, 16 A. 2d. 773 (1940), affirmed sub. nom. Riley v. New York
Trust Company, 315 U.S. 343 (1942). The question of situs was not before the
Supreme Court on appeal. The opinion states, "The parties are agreed, and it is
therefore assumed, that Delaware is the situs of the stock." 315 U.S. 343 at 346 (1942).
Under that stipulation the Supreme Court went on to hold that Delaware had com-
plete power and discretion in disposing of the stock.
101. 25 Del. Ch. 92, 12 A. 2d 392 (1940).
102. 9 Wall. 740 (U.S. 1869). See Part H].
103. 12 A. 2d at 395-396.
104. 209 N. Y. 375, 103 N.E. 697 (1913).
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New Jersey corporation, which were being held for safekeeping in New
York. The corporation had refused to transfer the stock on the New
York executor's assignment, and the executor sued for damages. The
crucial question of situs of the stock for administration purposes was
decided adversely to the executor in the Appellate Division. It rendered
an opinion'0 5 which said that the situs might be either at the domicile
or in the state of incorporation, but not in New York. The Court of
Appeal reversed, held that the presence of the certificates in New York
established situs there, and permitted recovery of damages.
Writers in the field of conflict of laws are of one mind in taking the
mercantile viewpoint,10 independently of the Uniform Stock Transfer
Act. The Restatement's position that the administrator in possession of
the certificate is entitled to the shares is shown in Section 477, and it is
said there, in Comment c:
"The administrator in possession of the certificate can
administer it in the same way as any other chattel which is part
of the estate.... Should the corporation, upon presentation of
the certificate and of sufficient evidence of the appointment of
the administrator, refuse to transfer the shares to the adminis-
trator or his transferee, such administrator or his transferee
respectively can proceed against the corporation by suit in his
own name even though there is a local administrator in the
forum."'1
0 7
B. Effect of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act
There need be no special quarrel with the situs theory embodied in
the Jellenik case'08 (or state court decisions to the same effect) as of the
year the decision was rendered, 1900. Since then, however, a vital change
in the nature of the American corporate share has taken place. The bundle
of legal rights in the corporate share is not now made up in the same
way as in 1900. Then it was a written chose in action of a complex
variety and a true intangible; the 1954 share has become, in important
ways, actual tangible property which is embodied in the certificate. This
revolution in concept has been accomplished partly through judicial
recognition of the expanded law merchant which underlies the trading
of daily millions on the exchanges. Of more general importance has
105. 153 App. Div. 655, 138 N.Y. Supp. 725 (lst Dept. 1912).
106. See e.g. 3 BEA. , THE CoI'mLIcT or LAws § 477 (1935); GOODRICH, CoNrUcT
OF LAWS § 180 (2d ed. 1938).
107. ,ESTATEmENT, CONFLCT OF LAwS (1934).
108. Jellenik v. Huron Copper Mining Company, supra note 91.
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been the enactment of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act, and we are
informed by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws' 00 that the
Act, with some variations, has been enacted in all 48 states, Hawaii,
Alaska and the District of Columbia." 0 As one of only two Uniform
Laws (the other being the Negotiable Instruments Law) to make a clean
sweep and win approval from every legislature, it should command
maximum respect from the courts in its adoption of the mercantile theory,
both as law and as an expression of the needs of the business community.
Section 1 of the Act provides that title to a certificate and to the
shares represented thereby can be transferred only by delivery of the
certificate duly endorsed or with written assignment attached."' The
actual title to shares as against the rest of the world is governed by
possession of the certificate. This is made clear by Sections 5 and 6.112
To lose a certificate is to lose the right to the shares unless bond is
posted."53
Under the original Act garnishment or attachment of the stock of a
shareholder could be had only through seizure of the certificate." 4 This
provision is of special importance, because it gives to the court hav-
ing jurisdiction of the certificate power to determine interests in the
shares." 5
The Uniform Act does not contain any provision specifying situs of
stock for administration purposes. Indeed to have such a provision
might seem almost superfluous, and this notwithstanding Section 2,
which provides that nothing in the Act shall be construed to enlarge the
109. 6 U.L.A., 1953 Supplement.
110. See Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 403.050 et seq. (1949); KAN. GEN. STAT. §§ 17-4801 et seq.
(1949).
111. Mo. REv. STAT. § 403.050 (1949). Missouri and Kansas both have enlarged this
section to permit specifically endorsement by a trustee in bankruptcy, executor,
administrator or other fiduciary. See KAN. Gus. STAT. § 17-4801 (1949).
112. Mo. REv. STAT. § 403.090, 403.100 (1949).
113. U.S.T.A. § 17, Mo. PEv. STAT. § 403210 (1949).
114. Missouri and Kansas have amended this provision to permit attachment on
the books of the corporation as an alternative to seizure of the certificate. In Mis-
souri precedence is given to the certificate attachment, however, but Kansas makes
the matter one of first in time, first in right. Compare Mo. REv. STAT. § 403.170
(1949) with KAN. Gus. STAT. § 17-4813 (1949). See also State ex rel. North American
Co. v. Koerner, 357 Mo. 908, 211 S.W. 2d 698 (1948) (upholding the provision for
attachment on the books, as not impossibly repugnant to the remainder of the Act).
The effect of this case is discussed at length in The Uniform Stock Transfer Act in
Missouri, 1951 WAsH. U. L. Q. 384.
115. See the general annotation in 122 AL.R. 333 (1939).
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power of trustees, executors, administrators or other fiduciaries to make
valid endorsements or assignments." 6
It is believed evident that the reference to executors and administra-
tors in Section 2 does not restrict the right of the executor having the
certificate to administer upon the shares. The framers of the Act were
merely being careful not to expand the ordinary powers of an executor or
trustee to sell or dispose of property. An executor or trustee must still
show his authority to make a transfer, through exhibition of a court order
or a power in the will or trust instrument, as he did before the Act. In
other words, possible breaches of fiduciary duty must still be inquired
into by transferees and transfer agents.
Thus, Section 2, in making clear that the Act does not validate an
otherwise improper fiduciary endorsement, has no effect on the juris-
diction of courts to declare ownership. If the Act truly embodies the
shares in the certificates (and that is its central principle), then juris-
diction in rem, including probate jurisdiction, exists where the certificate
is. So runs the thought of Professor Beale when he says in his authorita-
tive treatise," 7 in speaking of the Uniform Act:
"This statute, though it does not specifically deal with the
question of administration, in all other respects, seems to accept
the mercantile theory. ... It is submitted that the Uniform Stock
Transfer Act should be construed as adopting the mercantile
view wholeheartedly, including the treatment of the certificates
as controlling the shares for purposes of administration." ' 8
The Uniform Stock Transfer Act is therefore solid ground upon
which to base the expectation that state courts and the Supreme Court
will, in the future, recognize administration upon the certificate as admin-
istration upon the stock.
C. Situs of Corporate Shares: The Missouri View
Of special interest in the application of the newly enacted Section
466.010 is the previous course of Missouri decisions on the situs of stock
and the proper place for its administration. At one time, owing to the
diligence and the litigiousness of some of its public administrators, Mis-
116. Mo. Rv. STAT. § 403.060 (1940). See also § 18 of the Act, Mo. REv. STAT.
§ 403.220 (1949) (application of ordinary rules, including law merchant, to cases not
touched by the Act.)
117. BEALE, Tm CoNmcT OF LAws (1935).
118. Id. Vol. 3, § 477.2.
1954]
29
Baker: Baker: In the Administration of Intangibles
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1954
30 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19
souri was at the forefront in determinations of this question; its Loh-
man".9 decisions, infra, have received wide attention.
The starting point in discussion of the Missouri law will be taken
as Armour Brothers Banking Company v. Smith, 120 an 1892 attachment
case. It held that a stock certificate was mere indicia of the actual share
interest of the stockholder, and that the attachment of the certificate
was not effective to confer jurisdiction over the shares, the particular
company having been incorporated in Texas.
Richardson v. Busch'2 ' presented squarely the question of the proper
place for administration of stock. The defendant, in possession of stock
certificates in the New York corporation belonging to a New York dece-
dent, had delivered them to a New York domiciliary administrator. The
Public Administrator of St. Louis then sued the defendant for conversion.
Judge Valliant wrote an opinion which said that if the stock "was in
New York at the time of his death, it cannot be made the basis of admin-
istration in this state, even if our statute essayed to make it so. 1 2 2 He
relied principally on two cases, Armour Brothers, supra (in which case
he was the trial judge), and Jellenik v. Huron Copper Mining Com-
pany, 23 saying that the court in the Armour Brothers case declared the
fundamental doctrine that the res was not within Missouri's borders.
Richardson v. Busch set the stage for the litigation yet to come. It
was easily inferable from its language that the court would henceforth
recognize only Missouri administrations on shares of Missouri corpora-
tions. Fine prospects were in this manner opened to the diligent public
administrator, who could and would discover stockholdings of non-resi-
dents in Missouri corporations and demand their transfer to him. These
prospects were confirmed in 1919 by a series of cases bearing the name
of the St. Louis Public Administrator, Harry Troll. In Troll v. Third
National Bank of St. Louis, 24 an Illinois domiciliary executrix had a
119. Ira H. Lohman, one-time Public Administrator of Cole County, possibly
contributed most to the law of this question with seven reported cases bearing his
name, although Harry Troll, Public Administrator of St. Louis, is not to be denied
his share of credit, his name appearing on four reported cases.
120. 113 Mo. 12, 20 S.W. 690 (1892).
121. 198 Mo. 175, 95 S.W. 894 (1906). See also the companion case, De La Vergne
v. Richardson, 198 Mo. 189, 95 S.W. 898 (1906), wherein the administrator's letters
were revoked for lack of any administerable property in Missouri.
122. Id. at 897.
123. 177 U.S. 1 (1900) discussed supra.
124. 278 Mo. 74, 211 S.W. 545 (1919). See also the companion cases (not officially
reported) of Troll v. Third National Bank of St. Louis, 216 S.W. 922 (1919); Troll v.
United Railway Company, 216 S.W. 923 (1919); Troll v. National Bank of Commerce,
216 S.W. 923 (1919).
30
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 1 [1954], Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol19/iss1/6
1954] CONFLICT OF LAWS 31
certificate for 33 shares of the defendant's stock. The St. Louis Public
Administrator sued for the transfer of that stock to him. The Supreme
Court, relying entirely on Richardson v. Busch, held that the situs of the
stock was the state of incorporation, Missouri, and that the Public Admin-
istrator had power to act under a statute permitting him to administer
when property was left exposed to loss, saying, "Any estate with no
administrator to look after it is exposed to loss", even though in the
instant case the estate was entirely bank stock.
The Troll case thus refused to recognize any but a Missouri admin-
istration on shares of stock in a Missouri corporation. This was a holding
well calculated to discourage investments by non-residents in Missouri
corporations but fortunately the commitment of the court to that position
was only temporary, as will now be seen.
Ira H. Lohman's series of battles with the Kansas City Southern
Railway (a Missouri corporation) through the New York and Missouri
courts provided the most recent judicial development of Missouri law.
The Lohman decisions, the last of which was handed down in 1930, were
all rendered under the law prior to the 1923 legislation which solved the
problem by simply prohibiting administration of stock of non-residents.
The first decedent to receive Lohman's attention was one Beach,
who died in New York in 1922 holding certificates of Kansas City
Southern stock in that state. Beach's executors brought suit against
Kansas City Southern in the New York Federal Court. The district
court's decision for the plaintiffs 25 was appealed to the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals, which affirmed and said:
".... for, though shares of stock have a "situs" in the state of
incorporation, they likewise have one for the purposes of Sec-
tion 57 [of the Judicial Code] in the state where the corporation
is engaged in business and where the stock certificates were held
by the deceased and are held by his executors .... ."126
Two subsequent cases 1 27 added little, but then came three cases
involving different decedents, each entitled Lohman v. Kansas City South-
125. Norrie v. Kansas City Southern Railway Company, 7 F. 2d 158 (S.D. N.Y.
1925).
126. Norrie v. Lohman, 16 F. 2d 355 (2d Cir. 1926).
127, Peet Bros. Mfg. Co. v. Lohman, 211 Mo. App. 984, 295 S.W. 504 (1927), where
Lohman stipulated himself out of court, and Fairchild v. Lohman, 13 F. 2d 252 (W.D.
Mo. 1926), wherein Judge Reeves took occasion to say that "personal property ...
follows the person of the owner" subject only to exceptions in favor of creditors and
distributees, and refused to follow the Troll case, although he said he was distinguish-
ing it.
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ern Railway Company, all of which were decided by the Supreme Court
of Missouri en banc in 1930. In the first case, Docket No. 27317,128 the
court rendered a full and exhaustive opinion on the following facts:
Upmann, a New York decedent, had Kansas City Southern certificates
located in New York. The corporation transferred the shares to his New
York executors on demand. Since the railroad was a Missouri corpora-
tion Lohman sued for the same shares on the ground that the Troll case
established the situs of the stock in Vissouri. It was apparent that
Lohman would win if the Troll case were permitted to stand. Lohman
lost. The court said:
"We have much doubt concerning the correctness of the
ruling in the Troll case, if that case be regarded as laying down
the absolute and unvarying rule that, for all purposes and
regardless of the absence of claims against the estate of deceased
by this state or by its citizens for debts or as distributees, the
situs of shares of stock in Missouri corporations is in this state
and nowhere else."' 29
The court placed particular emphasis upon the decision of the United
States Supreme Court in the Disconto-Gesellschaft case, 3 0 saying:
"The Disconto-Gesellschaft case seems conclusively to estab-
lish the rule that shares of stock in a corporation, represented by
appropriate certificates of stock, constitute property in them-
selves, and not merely evidence of ownership, and have a situs
for some purposes elsewhere than in the state where the corpora-
tion is domiciled. That case announces the latest and the con-
trolling rule of the United States Supreme Court....
"The certificates of stock held by Upmann must therefore be
regarded as having the character of personal property in them-
selves and a situs for some purposes in the state of New York."
The second and third cases, Dockets 27318181 and 27319,182 dealt with
similar sets of facts, except that Lohman's demand upon the railroad for
the shares was made before it had transferred the stock to the New
York executors, and as a result, the New York executors had been
compelled to recover the shares by prior suits in New York. Lohman
was a party to the second suit by substituted personal service, but in the
128. 326 Mo. 819, 33 S.W. 2d 112 (1930.)
129. Id. at 115.
130. Direction der Disconto-Gesellschaft v. United States Steel Corporation, 267
U.S. 22 (1925).
131. 326 Mo. 842, 33 S.W. 2d 118 (1930).
132. 326 Mo. 868, 33 S.W. 2d 117 (1930).
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third, no effort was made to join him as a party. The railroad had com-
plied with both New York judgments. Lohman, now suing the railroad in
Missouri, lost again. In No. 27319 the court ruled:
"Defendant [the railroad] maintained an office in New York
and was there personally served with process. The Supreme
Court of that state, therefore, had before it both defendant and
the stock, to the extent that it was called upon to deal with said
stock, and had full power and jurisdiction to decide the right of
the New York executors to have the shares of stock transferred
to them. Under the full faith and credit clause of the Federal
Constitution, it is our duty to recognize the validity and finality
of the judgment rendered by that court."1 33
The court applied the same reasoning to No. 27318 and found it
unnecessary to decide whether the substituted personal service was
effective as to Lohman.
Since Lohman, little remains of the Troll cases. The Lohman opin-
ions markedly recognize that situs of a share accompanies the certificate,
for purposes of administration. It is to be observed also that the dece-
dent's domicile was not even a factor in the reasoning of the court.
In assessing Missouri law today there should not be any special
concern with the emphatic language used by Judge Valliant in the
Richardson case almost fifty years ago, when he said that jurisdiction
over a share is not conferred by the presence of the certificate, and the
"certificate could not be made the basis of administration in this state,
even if our statute essayed to make it so.' -134 That statement does not
reach the fundamental point that the legislatures and courts of other
states may give jurisdiction to Missouri by generally recognizing the
mercantile characteristics of stock shares-where Missouri by its own
statute could not.
As a result of Lohman and the Uniform Stock Transfer Act, Missouri
seems now committed to a certificate-situs principle of jurisdiction.
Administration upon a certificate should henceforth be deemed equiv-
alent to administration upon the shares it represents.
D. Rationale
As an original question the situs of shares might have been deemed
to be where the corporate assets are. The state having control of the
assets might well have been the ultimate jurisdiction before which the
133. Ibid.
134. Richardson v. Busch, 198 Mo. 175, 95 S.W. 894 (1906).
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primary stock rights-the right to receive dividends and share assets
upon liquidation-would have to seek recognition. As a matter of naked
power between independent sovereigns such a view of situs may be
correct,'3 5 but in the United States where a typical corporation may have
assets in a score of states, it would be highly impractical. It was early
decided that the internal affairs of the corporation, including rights in
its stock, were to be governed and determined by the state under whose
law it was organized. The state of incorporation was looked to as a
technical headquarters to obviate conflicting judicial management of
the internal affairs of the corporation.
However, administration in the state of incorporation is also a highly
impractical requirement; in the case of a diversified investment program,
it would mean administration of the investor's estate in many places.
That does not happen, as lawyers well know. Seemingly it is avoided by
a general business custom of accepting the endorsement of any duly
appointed executor who produces a certificate-which is nothing more
or less than a widespread, day-to-day reliance on the mercantile theory of
dealing with stock.' 3 6 It is in no wise a recognition of a "superior right"
in the domiciliary executor, even though in by far the greatest number of
cases certificates are held at the domicile of the decedent and the executor
producing them is appointed there. This statement may be tested by
supposing that a domiciliary representative requests a transfer of stock
without producing the certificates, they being in the hands, let us say, of
an ancillary administrator. The reaction of the transfer agent to such a
request is readily predictable. It will be refused because of the Uniform
Stock Transfer Act. Since the certificates are neither lost nor destroyed,
the issuance of new certificates without surrender of the old would sub-
ject the corporation to a double liability on the shares.137
It should be repeated here that the mercantile idea of stock dealing
is not a mere practice of business men without logical, legal foundations.
True, courts originally settled upon the state of incorporation as the situs
of stock, since that state had a basic jurisdiction over the person of the
corporation. However, we have previously seen that the idea of juris-
diction as resting upon control of the persons whose legal relations are
135. Cf. Cities Service Company v. McGrath, 343 U.S. 330 (1952), where the
Supreme Court refused to apply regular situs rules (in the case of a negotiable
debenture) if to do so would defeat recovery of American securities looted by enemy
forces.
136. Occasionally the reliance is on special statutes.
137. U. S.T.A. § 17.
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the intangible is but a general truth which is subject to further refine-
ment.3 8 Nothing prevents a state having an ultimate jurisdiction of that
kind from allowing the issuance of freely circulating documents such as
checks, notes, bonds and stock certificates, which to paraphrase Justice
Holmes,1 3 9 so far represent the intangible legal relation that only through
and by means of the paper can the benefits of ownership be enforced, in
ordinary cases. Properly viewed, the very recognition of the person who
owns the paper as owner of the intangible, constitutes a release of juris-
diction by the state of ultimate control, in favor of the laws and courts
of the place where the paper is. This is the rationale of the mercantile
theory.
Let us advance a step further. Suppose an administrator produces a
stock certificate and the transfer agent refuses transfer on the ground
that in the state of incorporation a local administrator is acting and
claiming to administer upon the shares. Should administration upon the
certificate take precedence? The answer of Goodrich and the Restate-
ment is yes. Goodrich says:
"Granting that the ultimate control of the transfer of shares
of stock is in the state of incorporation, the adoption by that
state of a statute such as the Uniform Act would indicate that a
transfer of the shareholder's interest would be ineffective, even
though ordered by a court of the corporate domicile, unless the
court had control over the certificate, and that a transfer ordered
by a court having jurisdiction over the certificate would be
recognized as valid at the corporate domicile. The stock should
therefore be regarded as an asset and administered at the place
where the certificate is located, rather than in the state of
incorporation.'1 40
He does not pursue the point, but it is permissible to ask whether the
state of incorporation is compelled, under the full faith and credit clause,
to recognize the administration upon the certificate-or may it, having
permitted the issuance of the certificate and its circulation outside its
borders as fully representative of the stock, now deny that it did so, and
for purposes of administration conclude that the situs of the stock is
within its jurisdiction. It is easy enough to say that since the state of
incorporation has a fundamental right to declare the incidents of its
138. Part 11-A, supra.
139. Direction der Disconto-Gesellschaft v. U.S. Steel, 267 U.S. 22, 28 (1925).
140. GoonIcCH, CoNrcr or LAWs § 180 (2d ed. 1938). Accord: RESTATEuINT,
CoNmcT OF LAWS § 477, Comment c. (1934).
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shares and certificates, its decision in situating the shares cannot be
questioned elsewhere. Nevertheless, constitutional questions can be seen
-not only of full faith and credit, but of due process and perhaps of
abridgement of a contract obligation, assuming that the stock in question
is a contract between corporation and stockholder of which the state
statutes, including the Uniform Stock Transfer Act, are impliedly a part.
Brief note should be made of the practice of holding shares of stock
of an individual decedent in a street name or in the hands of a broker,
endorsed in blank. In such a case the decedent's rights are not to be
identified with those of ordinary stockholders, for he owns but a simple
right to receive specified shares from the broker on demand. This right
is a mere claim, though specifically enforceable, and would probably be
administerable where the broker is, like a debt.
We may sum up the state of the law relating to probate juris-
diction over corporate shares in the following fashion. The tendency of
courts to accept commercial habits and to permit dealing with the certifi-
cate to be conclusive, was noticeable long before general enactment of
the Uniform Stock Transfer Act. The Restatement and the text writers
have endorsed that tendency fully. Strong practical recognition of the
mercantile theory has always been found in the requirement of lawyers
and tranfer agents that the certificate must be produced to effect a trans-
fer. Today the universal presence of the Stock Transfer Act permits the
opinion to be hazarded that the mercantile theory will supplant all others,
in the courts as well as on the exchanges.
The practical advantages of the mercantile theory in estate admin-
istration cannot be disputed. Needs of beneficiaries, executors and trans-
fer agents will be best served, and transfers expedited, by permitting the
transfer of stock at the instance of the executor who produces the certif-
icates. In short, the administration and transfer of stock should be com-
parable to the administration and transfer of negotiable instruments;
comparable benefits will flow from that treatment.
IV. CoxsTTuoNA LrmTATIONS IN THm
ADMi-sTRAT oN or INTANGIrLs
Justice Jackson, writing of the full faith and credit clause in the
Columbia Law Review, has said:
"We have so far as I can ascertain the most localized and
[Vol. 19
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conflicting system [of administering justice] of any country
which presents the external appearance of nationhood."' 41
Yet there are unifying factors in our system, and among them the
due process and full faith and credit clauses stand out. To the extent
inter-state conflicts in the administration of intangibles are to be resolved,
these clauses will be the principal instruments of the courts. Several
indirect references have already been made to their effect upon probate
decrees, but it is believed desirable to make a more comprehensive,
though not exhaustive, statement of the subject.
Article IV, Section 1, of the Constitution requires each state to give
full faith and credit to "the public Acts, Records and Judicial Proceedings
of every other State." Congress, by the same section, is authorized to
prescribe "the effect" of such acts, records and proceedings, and it almost
immediately exercised this power.142 The current statute is found in
Sections 1738 and 1739 of Ttile 28, United States Code, and provides that
acts, records and judicial proceedings shall in every state have the same
full faith and credit as they have by law or usage in the court of the
state from which they are taken.' 43
The adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution in
1868 has proved, in the operation of its due process clause, a rigorous
restraint on the freedom with which a state can act upon its internal
affairs. Due process goes to the validity of action in and of the state itself;
full faith and credit concerns the external respect to be given to a state's
action. That they are closely connected was reiterated by the Supreme
Court in 1946: "A judgment obtained in violation of procedural due
process is not entitled to full faith and credit when sued upon in another
jurisdiction."'144 Probably this statement by the Supreme Court is good
in its reverse sense under certain circumstances: Any purported judg-
ment against property to which other states are not compelled to give
full faith and credit because of lack of jurisdiction in rem, is probably
violative of due process and void in the state of first instance.145 The
Restatement provides:
"If a State attempts to exercise power by creating interests
141. Jackson, Full Faith and Credit-The Lawyers' Clause of the Constitution, 45
COL. LAW Rav. 1, 18 (1945).
142. Act of May 26, 1790 c. 11, 1 STAT. 122.
143. 62 STAT. 947 (1948), 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1738 and 1739.
144. Griffin v. Griffin, 327 U.S. 220, 228 (1946).
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with respect to persons or things which it has no jurisdiction to
create, its action is in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to
the Constitution and is void in the State itself. The Supreme
Court of the United States may review all cases whether from a
lower Federal court or from a State court of last resort which
involve a question of the exercise of power on the part of a State
when it has no jurisdiction."' 4 6
An administration proceeding is entitled to full faith and credit as a
"judicial proceeding."' 47 While certain steps in the proceeding may give
rise to personal rights and duties,148 nevertheless it is a proceeding in
rem.
149
"It is elementary that [a] probate proceeding by which juris-
diction of a probate court is asserted over the estate of a dece-
dent for the purpose of administering the same is in the nature
of a proceeding in rem, and is therefore one as to which all of
the world is charged with notice."'5 0
The decrees of a probate court in which we are interested are those
partially or finally distributing an estate, or directing the sale of property,
because under them interests in property are created without regard to
what persons, if any, are officially before the court. Since Pennoyer v.
Neff1r5 and Thompson v. Whitman, 52 especially, it has been accepted as
settled that in rem proceedings are entitled to full faith and credit every-
where in the United States, subject to the right of other states to inquire
into whether the court of first instance had actual jurisdiction over the
res. If, for example, a probate court decrees distribution of personal prop-
erty not having situs in the state where the court sits, other courts are
privileged to refuse credit to that decree. 15
Thompson v. Whitman arose out of a controversy over the sloop
Anna S. Whitman, a tangible object whose disputed location at a given
time was a factual matter. Likewise, the location of intangibles might
conceivably be disputed on the factual level, but the far more important
146. RESTATEmET, CoNFucT or LAWS § 43, Comment a (1934).
147 So treated in Riley v. New York Trust Co., 315 U.S. 343 (1942); Michigan
Trust Company v. Ferry, 228 U.S. 346 (1913); Tilt v. Kelsey, 207 U.S. 43 (1907).
148. E.g. litigation of claims, discovery of assets.
149. For a thorough analysis of this concept see Sines, The Administration of a
Decedent's Estate as a Proceeding in Rem, 43 MscH. L. Rnv. 675 (1945).
150. Goodrich v. Ferris, 214 U.S. 71, 80-81 (1909).
151. Note 145 supra.
152. 18 Wall. 457 (U.S. 1873).
153. Baker v. Baker, Eccles & Co., 242 U.S. 394 (1917) (distribution of corporate
stock).
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question arises where the facts are conceded. Is every state free to apply
its own notions of legal situs to conceded facts, and reach a hostile juris-
dictional conclusion? In other words, can a state compel full faith and
credit to be given to its decrees, or deny credit to foreign decrees, by
adopting an unusual concept of situs?
The answer to this question seems rather clear. In other fields a
state has not been able to evade constitutional obligations by re-defining
the concepts involved. Thus, in a tax case the Wisconsin court has said:
"It seems evident to us that a state may not, by definition,
construction, or other process, domesticate a person or corpora-
tion in fact domiciled elsewhere, in order to avoid the application
of constitutional principles established by the Supreme Court of
the United States relative to jurisdiction for purposes of taxa-
tion. To say that it may do so is to contend that the limits of the
state's jurisdiction to tax are wholly self-imposed."'154
Neither can a domiciliary state acquire jurisdiction over an out-of-
state intangible by calling itself the situs. The Supreme Court has found
such a domiciliary decree to be violative of due process and not entitled
to full faith and credit.155 The cases and authorities cited in Part II supra
are confirmation of the jurisdiction of the court of situs, as customarily
defined. Jurisdiction being established in that court, its decrees comport
with due process and are entitled to credit everywhere. 156 The restraint
upon the domiciliary court has been phrased in other language, but to
the same effort is Overby v. Gordon'57 where a Georgia decedent had a
large bank account in Washington, D. C. The Supreme Court there said:
"Now it is undeniable that the sovereignty of the state of
Georgia and the jurisdiction of its courts.., did not extend to or
embrace the assets of the decedent situated within the territorial
jurisdiction of the District of Columbia."
Judge Learned Hand, while on the district court bench, put te matter in
the following language:
"No doubt the state of New York, as respects goods situated
154. Newport Co. v. Wisconsin Tax Commission, 219 Wis. 293, 261 N.W. 884, 890
(1935). And see Hanna v. Stedman, 230 N.Y. 326, 130 N.E. 566 (1921) (on conceded
facts, jurisdiction-in-rem conclusion may be re-examined by second state).
155. Baker v. Baker, Eccles Co., note 153 supra, and see Iowa v. Slimmer, 248
U.S. 115 (1918).
156. See Hopkins, The Extraterritorial Effect of Probate Decrees, 53 YALE L. J.
221, 234 (1944).
157. 177 U.S. 214 (1900).
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within its own jurisdiction, might provide that an executor
appointed elsewhere should be its own representative, and that
process served upon him within its own borders should be
effective to determine the disposition of all such goods. [Citing
cases] Yet if it attempted to go further than this, to take any
steps towards the disposition of a decedent's goods situated else-
where and under the existing administration of another state, it
would violate the common understanding respecting such matters
and expose itself to the disregard of its judgments by the state
which had appointed the executor and assumed the direction of
his official conduct. Moreover, since the fourteenth amendment,
the assumption of such a jurisdiction which conflicted with the
exclusive authority of another state over a matter within its
jurisdiction would itself be disregarded at the outset, at least in a
federal court: nor would the executor be left to the assertion of
the invalidity of such proceedings, when it was presented for
execution or as evidence. Pennoyer v Neff, 95 U.S. 714."'15
Where the normal rules for ascertaining situs of intangibles are not
clear, it is possible that two states may enter conflicting claims of probate
jurisdiction over the same items, each with justification. Thus, when
Missouri's rule was that the situs of stock of M.issouri's corporation was
in Missouri and nowhere else,'5 9 federal courts in New York thought
otherwise, and decided that a New York executor with a stock certificate
in a Missouri corporation could administer the stock.1 09 Confronted with
the New York decision, the Missouri Supreme Court, in Lohman v.
Kansas City Southern Ry., ruled that the New York decree and admin-
istration was entitled to full faith and credit.'0 '
Instances will arise where a given intangible will concededly be
subject to the jurisdiction of two or more states for administration pur-
poses, with each state willing to concede the basic jurisdiction of others.10 2
Thus debtors of decedents, especially corporate debtors, may well be
subject to process in several states, and any of several administrators
may be entitled to sue and collect the debt. Payment to any of them
should operate as a full acquittance,' 0 3 but absent payment, any of them
may sue for recovery. In such a case it is suggested that the courts will,
158. Thorburn v. Gates, 225 Fed. 613, 616 (S.D. N.Y. 1915).
159. Troll v. Third National Bank, 278 Mo. 74, 211 S.W. 545 (1919).
160. Norrie v. Lobman, 16 F. 2d 355 (2d Cir. 1926).
161. 326 Mo. 868, 33 S.W. 2d 117 (1930).
162. An intimation of that situation is found in Standard Oil Company v. New
Jersey, 341 U.S. 428 (1951), where New Jersey successfully escheated corporate stock
and dividends of its domestic corporations.
163. RESTATEmEm, CoNFmcT or LAWS § 480 (1934).
[Vol. 19
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as a practical matter, if not as a constitutional requirement, defer to that
court first assuming jurisdiction.0 4
That it may be a constitutional reqiurement is indicated by the fact
that service of process upon a debtor is deemed to operate as a seizure of
the debt, to the extent it is susceptible of seizure. At least it has been so
held many times in the garnishment cases, where debts owing to a non-
resident are subjected, quasi in rem, to the payment of local creditors of
the non-resident.16 5 Garnishment cases are important to this discussion
because they proceed upon a jurisdictional foundation comparable to that
of an administration. In either case, the objective of state power is to
declare or create rights in the debt, and in fact, it is common for court
opinions, where jurisdictional points are in issue, to cite the two types of
proceeding as equivalent.
A garnishment case having important bearing on the problem is
Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry. v. Sturm, 6 6 where the Kansas
Supreme Court attempted to disregard the seizure of a debt by a foreign
court on the ground that by its definition, mobitia sequuntur personam,
the situs of the debt was in Kansas. The railroad in question had been
garnished by an Iowa writ for a Kansas workiman's wages, and the work-
man immediately sued for the same wages in a Kansas court. In the eyes
of the Kansas court, Iowa was without jurisdiction. The United States
Supreme Court thought otherwise. Situs of the debt was wherever the
debtor might be served. Iowa had by its process seized the debt and it had
jurisdiction. The Kansas judgment was therefore reversed outright for
failure to give full faith and credit to the Iowa proceedings. The implica-
tion of the case is two-fold: First, the Kansas attempt to use the mobilia
doctrine as a jurisdictional test was prohibited by the Constitution.
Second, the court first seizing the debt would seem to have drawn juris-
diction to itself, excluding other courts.'16 7
Many questions of the application of the Constitution to administra-
tion of intangibles remain unsettled today. In dealing with them a lawyer
164. But cf. §§ 504 and 505, RSSTATEDET, oF CoNr cT Laws (1934), which indicate
that a number of suits might be prosecuted concurrently, and the one first reduced to
judgment would supersede the others.
165. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Hostetter, 240 U.S. 620 (1916); Harris v. Balk, 198
U.S. 215 (1905).
166. 174 U.S. 710 (1899), reversing 58 Kan. 818, 51 Pac. 1100 (1897).
167. Cf. Lion Bonding Co. v. Karatz, 262 U.S. 77 (1923) and Harkin v. Brundage,
276 U.S. 36 (1928) (where two courts have concurrent jurisdiction, in receivership
cases, the first asserting it takes exclusive jurisdiction).
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can only predict on the basis of the present reports what the likely action
of a court will be. He should, however, bear in mind that the court whose
decision he is predicting is not a state court of last resort, but the Federal
Supreme Court. The right of a state to administer upon an intangible is
limited by the due process clause, questions under which are clearly
federal in nature, and by the full faith and credit clause. The Supreme
Court itself is "the final arbiter when the question is raised as to what is
a permissible limitation on the full faith and credit clause."'0l 8
V. A NEw NuLmIrcATioN DocTmRx: KANSAS SENATE BILL 190
On March 30, 1953, the Governor of Kansas approved a bill, Senate
Bill 190, relating to administration of out-of-state property of Kansas
decedents.' 6 9 It has been said to be a retalitory measure for Missouri's
Senate Bill 63. However, the concept of retaliation seems a strange one
under the circumstances. All that Missouri had done was to retreat from
an unworkable legislative innovation and reinstate the law of ancillary
administration as it had previously existed in Missouri,170 and as it now
exists in most other states,171 including Kansas. Indeed, Sections 59-801
and 59-802 of the Kansas General Statutes permit ancillary administra-
168. Both in Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 302 (1942) and in Johnson
v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581, 585 (1951).
169. Bill passed the Senate March 4, 1953, was amended by the House and passed
on March 25. The Senate concurred March 26. The new Kansas law reads as follows,
with the portion added by the House italicized:
"Section 1. The courts of Kansas shall have exclusive jurisdiction to determine
the devolution of property by will or by descent of all persons who are residents of
Kansas at the time of death as to real property located in Kansas and tangible or
intangible personal property wherever located. Any determination with regard to the
devolution of such property by other courts except federal courts having jurisdiction
by reason of removal and appeals from Kansas courts, shall be void and of no effect,
and in all such cases, the director of revenue and taxation of the state of Kansas shall
refuse to issue any inheritance tax order, waiver or clearance. In any case where a
resident of Kansas shall die owning real estate in Kansas, or tangible or intangible
personal property wherever located, exceeding the statutory inheritance tax exemp-
tion for his heirs at law, and the heirs at law or others entitled to commence admin-
istration proceedings in Kansas shall fail to do so, or shall commence administration
proceedings in any other state, the director of revenue of the state of Kansas provided
no order has been made for the payment of inheritance taxes shall be authorized to
commence administration proceedings in the county where such person was a resident
at the time of death, and upon notice provided by law, the probate court shall appoint
an executor or administrator upon such petition for administration as in other cases.
Such executor or administrator shall take possession of all tangible and intangible
personal property owned by the decedent, wherever located, and of all real estate
owned by the decedent located in the state of Kansas, and shall make full inventory
thereof for the director of revenue as provided by law."
170. See Part I infra.
171. The statutes of Illinois, Iowa, California and New York have been examined
as a random sample, and in each of them ancillary administration of tangibles and
intangibles of a non-resident is required or permitted.
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tion whenever the probate court deems it "necessary." Had Missouri
legislators copied these Kansas statutes instead of passing Senate Bill 63,
they would have arrived at a much broader, and more satisfactory, basis
for ancillary administration.
Kansas Senate Bill 190 purports to do two things: It declares a rule
of law and it establishes a procedure. The rule of law is that Kansas shall
have jurisdiction over property of Kansas decedents which is outside its
borders. Exclusive jurisdiction to determine devolution of "tangible or
intangible personal property wherever located" is vested in the Kansas
courts, and determinations by courts of other states are said to be void.
Observe that the statute does not, in its opening language, say that foreign
administration proceedings shall be entirely void; it proscribes only their
decrees of distribution. If the foreign probate court should transmit the
residue in its hands to the Kansas administrator for final distribution,
would the Kansas law be satisfied? Such an interpretation is contradicted
by the closing language of the statute when it directs that the Kansas
administrator, appointed on application of the Director of Revenue, shall
take into his possession all personal property wherever located. 172 No
legal means of carrying out this direction comes to mind.173 Nevertheless,
it indicates that even possession of property by a foreign administrator is
obnoxious to the expressed Kansas policy.
It will not be denied that the Kansas statute is a novel piece of
legislation in its unconcealed purpose of giving extra-territorial effect
to Kansas law. It is an attempt to apply the mobitia sequuntur personam
doctrine as a jurisdictional test. We have seen that the Kansas courts
have sometimes refused to administer upon goods of non-residents, citing
the mobilia doctrine, which they may constitutionally do.1 4 Now the
legislature, and not the Kansas courts, has tried to impose the mobilia
doctrine in such a way that it will withdraw jurisdiction from other states
and invade their sovereignty.
N Administration proceedings in one state purporting to affect property
interests not within the jurisdiction of that state violate the common
understanding and will be denied full faith and credit elsewhere. 75 Such
proceedings are not due process of law within the meaning of the Four-
172. It is impossible to tell whether this direction applies to all Kansas executors
and administrators, or only those appointed on application of the Director.
173. For practical results, conscientious Kansas administrators might resort to
dead-of-night excursions into other jurisdictions.
174. Part l1-D, supra.
175. See Part IV, supra.
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teenth Amendment, and are void in the state of first instance. 170 Thus
it should be expected that the Kansas courts will recognize the invalidity
of the new statute as promptly as any other courts.
There will be no attempt at this point to restate what has already
been said in earlier portions of this article relating to the jurisdiction of
states to administer upon intangibles. 77 The moving parties behind the
Kansas statute probably had not recently read the decisions of the
Supreme Court upon the subject.17 8 Very likely they did not realize that
once before, in the Sturm case, Kansas had attempted to use the mobilia
doctrine to establish the situs of an intangible within its borders, and the
Supreme Court held the attempt unconstitutional. 17 9
Brief attention should be given to the effect of the procedure which
Senate Bill 190 provides. If administration proceedings are commenced
in any other state, the Kansas Director of Revenue is authorized to
initiate administration in Kansas and have an executor or administrator
appointed "for administration as in other cases." This approach suggests
that the object of the bill is to protect inheritance tax revenues, but the
question arises whether it was really designed for, or in any way accom-
plishes that purpose.
With respect to tangible property of the decedent outside the State
of Kansas, Kansas cannot collect inheritance taxes, as a matter of due
process of law.'5 0 Therefore, the direction to administer upon such prop-
erty can have nothing to do with inheritance taxes.
Kansas may, under current decisions of the Supreme Court, levy
inheritance tax upon intangibles of its decedents wherever located.181
The new statute seems of little help in collecting that tax. Other Kansas
statutes of long standing permit the Director of Revenue, or the County
Attorney, to apply for appointment of an administrator where no local
administration has been commenced within four months after death.18 2
The Kansas Director of Revenue has deemed his power applicable to
176. Ibid.
177. See generally Parts 11 and III, supra.
178. E.g. Iowa v. Slimmer, 248 U. S. 115 (1918).
179. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry. v. Sturm, 174 U.S. 710 (1899), reversing
58 Kan. 818, 51 Pac. 1100 (1897). The principal exposition of the mobilia doctrine, held
unconstitutional in this case, will be found in an earlier Kansas opinion, Missouri
Pacific Ry. v. Sharritt, 43 Kan. 375, 23 Pac. 430, 431 (1889).
180. This was the exact holding of the Supreme Court in Treichler v. Wisconsin,
338 U.S. 251 (1949). See generally Part 1-C, supra.
181. Part 1-C, supra.
182. KAN. GEN. STAT. § 79-1521 (1949), and see § 79-1512 for non-judicial deter-
minations of inheritance tax.
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both testate and intestate estates,183 and accepting his own construction
of the statutes, it appears that Senate Bill 190 has given the Director of
Revenue no additional power and created no procedure useful in col-
lecting inheritance tax which was not already available.'8 4
It has already been observed that nearly all states, including Mis-
souri, have exempted intangible property of non-residents from any
inheritance taxes.'8 5 Thus when a Kansas decedent's intangible estate
is administered in Missouri under Senate Bill 63, inheritance taxes will
be payable to Kansas and not to Missouri. Note that this result stems
from Supreme Court decisions and state statutes of long standing. Kansas
Senate Bill 190 is not involved.
Even where there is no domiciliary administration of a Kansas resi-
dent's estate, and original letters are issued by the Missouri probate
court, Kansas need not fear any substantial loss of revenue, for reasons
unconnected with the new law. In larger estates there will be no motive
to avoid Kansas taxes because of the operation of the federal 80% credit
against the basic federal estate tax. 8 6 To obtain this credit the Missouri
executor will pay inheritance taxes to Kansas. In addition, it appears
that Kansas may very well assert any claim to inheritance taxes in
Missouri courts, by virtue of a county rule adopted in the statutes and
by court decision.' s ?
CONCLUSION
The passage of Senate Bill 63 in the 1951 Missouri legislative sessions
caused Vissouri law, respecting the administration of estates of non-
residents, once again to conform to the laws of most other states. The
enactment ended a virtual prohibition of such administrations, which
for many years had frustrated the wishes of beneficiaries of non-residents.
183. See his current affidavit form H-22, which has been in use for over 10 years.
184. However, after declaring that any determination of devolution by other
courts shall be void, the statute says, "in all such cases, the Director of Revenue and
Taxation of the State of Kansas shall refuse to issue any inheritance tax order, waiver
or clearance." This was the language added by the House amendment to the Senate
Bill, but what purpose is to be served by it is unclear. In the first place "all such
cases" refers to "any determination . . . by other courts." From that language it is
gathered that the Director may issue orders and waivers prior to the time of the final
decree of distribution by the foreign court. In the second place, the accepted mode of
determining inheritance taxes in Kansas is by an official order of the Director.
Perhaps this means that Kansas will refuse to assess any inheritance taxes in a proper
case.
185. Part I1-C, supra.
186. I.R.C. § 813.
187. State ex rel. Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Rogers, 238 Mo. App. 1115, 193
S.W. 2d 919 (1946) and see Mo. REv. STAT. § 507.020 (1949).
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Now the machinery of the Missouri probate courts is made available to
them, if they find it convenient to use it. Missouri banks again can be
appointed testamentary trustees of property located in Missouri, where
prior law effectively denied that possibility. However, use of the
amended section is conditioned upon there being a will which leaves a
legacy to a Missourian, outright or in trust. If the requirement is met,
administration of all property within the jurisdiction of Missouri can be
had in a Missouri probate court.
There is nothing mandatory in the law. Specified parties interested
in the estate must want administration in Missouri and apply for it.
Should they desire but a single domiciliary administration, that desire is
respected, and regardless of whether a legacy is left to a Missourian or
not, property in Missouri will, at the end of six months, be transmitted to
the domiciliary executor for administration. This optional feature of
the Missouri law gives it great flexibility, and careful lawyers will take
advantage of it. In applicable cases wills should provide for at least a
nominal gift to a Missourian, so that an option will be open to the
beneficiaries of the estate to have a Missouri administration or not,
depending upon the circumstances at the time the will takes effect.
It has already been mentioned that Senate Bill 63 did not go far
enough in permitting ancillary administrations.'" 5 Either the Kansas or
the Illinois statute on the subject would have better served Missouri's
purpose, as was suggested in Part V.'8 9 Both of those states, as well as
many others, have laws permitting ancillary administration of testate and
intestate estates.
The principal difficulty with the present Missouri law is that the
condition for ancillary administration is too restrictive. The typical estate
is intestate,/and in such a case Missouri law requires a six months waiting
period before Missouri intangibles can be made use of in estate admin-
istration. In small estates the principal items thus frozen are salaries
or wages due to a decedent non-resident, or his bank account. There is
no legal way for a Missouri employer or a Missouri bank to pay over
these items for six months after death. Further legislation is required,
in the public interest, to expand the basis for ancillary administration
and provide for ancillary orders refusing letters of administration.
188. See the example in Part I of the Missouri merchant who is unfortunate
enough to live across the state line.
189. K-Ax. GEN. STAT. §§ 59-801 and 59-802 (1949). The Illinois statute is ILL. Am.
STAT. Ch. 3, § 241 (Smith-Hurd 1941) discussed in Part II-D.
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This article has discussed at some length the question of jurisdiction
to administer upon intangibles and constitutional limitations upon the
exercise of a state's power in that field.190 These problems have nothing
to do with the validity of Section 466.010, but are concerned solely with
the determination of the precise scope of an ancillary administration.
Obviously, they are not problems created by the new Missouri law. They
are inherent in a non-centralized, federal system of government, and are
faced by each of the states, whenever it attempts to determine what
property it is authorized to administer.
The jurisdictional and constitutional questions discussed may prove
to be of diminished importance under the new Missouri law, because use
of that law for ancillary administration is permissive, not mandatory.
Presumably, therefore, the ancillary administration and the domiciliary
administration, if any, will be conducted harmoniously.
190. Parts 11, I1, and IV.
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